After Ukrainian former presidents and other public figures began returning Polish orders en masse, Polish politicians started returning Ukrainian awards.
Among them is Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the largest opposition party, Law and Justice, whose political camp includes President Karol Nawrocki. Kaczyński returned Ukraine’s Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise and said Poland should block negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
Against the backdrop of the fact that in Poland it is precisely representatives of PiS, led by Nawrocki, who are reacting most sharply to the naming of an Armed Forces of Ukraine unit after the “heroes of the UPA,” a version has become popular in Ukrainian political circles that the scandal is caused primarily by internal Polish politics, while the issue of the UPA and relations with Ukraine is being used as a convenient pretext for political promotion.
The political motives on the Polish side are indeed obvious
For Nawrocki and PiS, amplifying the UPA issue is useful in their confrontation with the liberal Donald Tusk and his Civic Platform. The domestic political agenda is thus shifted toward questions of historical memory—a subject this camp has long made its own. This is especially true of Nawrocki himself, who for a long time headed Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance—in effect serving as the Polish counterpart to Ukrainian memory-politics figures such as Volodymyr Viatrovych.
PiS also understands that, because of his close ties to Europe’s left-liberal elites, Tusk will not be able to criticize the UPA, “Banderites” and the Ukrainian authorities as sharply and demonstratively as Nawrocki and his party colleagues do.
That is why the development of this issue primarily benefits the opposition and is less advantageous for Tusk, who is trying to build his political line around other questions.
That is precisely why Tusk, although he condemned along with other Polish politicians the naming of an Armed Forces of Ukraine unit after the “heroes of the UPA,” is now clearly trying to lower the temperature of the scandal.
However, the current conflict is only an outward manifestation of a deeper problem in Ukrainian-Polish relations. Within a single European space, Ukraine and Poland act not only as allies, but also as competitors—for EU investment and for the role of regional leader in the eastern European part of the European Union.
Until recently, Poland effectively held that position alone. But Kyiv is now showing ever more actively that it does not intend to remain in a secondary role and is building direct relations with the largest countries of Western Europe.
Tusk himself has already publicly expressed outrage that decisions on Ukraine are being made by a narrow group of leading Western European countries—Germany, France and the United Kingdom—and demanded that Warsaw be included in the process.
In this sense, the differences between Tusk and Nawrocki concern style rather than substance
If PiS intends to present Ukraine with “historical bills” during the process of European integration—for the Volhynia massacre and attitudes toward the UPA—then Tusk and his party will most likely emphasize protecting Polish producers and demands that Kyiv strengthen the fight against corruption. Nawrocki’s party, however, will not forget those issues either.
The result in both cases may be similar: slowing Ukraine’s European integration and imposing conditions for EU accession on Kyiv that will weaken its position on the European market.
The current scandal around the UPA itself is unlikely to pass without consequences for Polish society. Sociologists are already recording a rise in anti-Ukrainian sentiment, and even Tusk’s team will not be able to ignore that factor.