“We Are Not Obliged to Support Them.” Merz Demanded Limits on Benefits for Ukrainians—Germany Cannot Deport Them for Now

At a meeting with Zelensky in Berlin, Chancellor Merz said Germany intended to “limit the number of Ukrainian men seeking refuge here” and “make it easier for them to return home.” According to Germany’s Central Register of Foreigners, by the beginning of 2025 about 1.2 million Ukrainians who had arrived after February 2022 were registered in the country. The share of men aged 18–60 among them is hard to estimate precisely: some have long since switched to independent residence permits.

Zelensky has long been pressing European partners to help return Ukraine’s mobilization pool. Ukraine faces an acute shortage of manpower: the 2024 mobilization law substantially expanded the categories of those liable for service and made deferment mechanisms more difficult. That is why flight abroad remains widespread—despite the formal suspension of consular services for men overseas.

Since March 2022, Ukrainians in the EU have benefited from temporary protection under Directive 2001/55/EC—a mechanism designed specifically for a mass influx of displaced people. The Council of the EU activated it through Decision 2022/382, marking the first use of the instrument since its creation. Protection has been extended repeatedly and remains in force until March 2027. It grants the right to residence, work, health care, education, and social benefits.

The key difference between temporary protection and ordinary refugee status is its collective, mass nature. It is not granted individually and cannot be withdrawn from a separate demographic group. The Directive does not provide for any differentiation by sex or age.

The entire debate concerns only men who are in Germany solely on the basis of Section 24 of the Residence Act—AufenthG—a temporary residence permit under the protection program. Those who have already legalized their status in other ways are not affected. A man who is officially employed and has worked for a sufficient period may apply for a work-based residence permit. Someone married to an EU citizen may apply for a family-based one. Highly qualified specialists can obtain a Blue Card. All these statuses exist independently of the temporary-protection regime and fall outside the proposed restrictions. Moreover, in 2025 the European Commission explicitly proposed making it easier for “well-integrated” Ukrainians—those who work, study or have learned the language—to move into national residence permits.

The most likely tool of pressure is a reduction in social benefits, not expulsion. The new government’s coalition agreement already provides that Ukrainians who arrived after April 1, 2025, will be moved from Bürgergeld to the lower level of support under the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act (AsylbLG). For those already in the country, this has not yet been enacted into law, and the question of stripping men aged 18–60 of Bürgergeld remains a matter of political debate—not a rule currently in force.

Poland took a similar route in 2024, restricting payments to Ukrainians through other legal mechanisms. The result was a wave of court challenges, some of which succeeded. German lawyers point to similar risks: European rules on equal treatment for displaced persons sharply narrow the room for maneuver.

The real turning point comes in March 2027. In July 2025, the Council of the EU already extended protection by a year—until March 4, 2027. At the same time, in September 2025 it adopted a recommendation on a coordinated exit from the temporary-protection regime: member states were urged to prepare national alternatives—residence permits based on work, study or family grounds—as well as voluntary return programs. If protection is not extended again in March 2027, every Ukrainian will enter the standard procedure for obtaining a residence permit. Refusal then becomes a legal instrument—but even then, expulsion would be individual, lengthy and inevitably challenged in court.

At the same time, the question of a readmission agreement remains open. The current 2007 agreement between the EU and Ukraine covers third-country nationals and stateless persons who transited through Ukraine—but not Ukrainians themselves. Without a new treaty obliging Kyiv to take men back at the request of the host country, forced expulsion remains legally incomplete even after temporary protection is lifted.

Forced return is a political signal, not a ready-made legal mechanism. Berlin currently has no tools to implement it immediately: European law blocks expulsions, the readmission agreement does not cover Ukrainian citizens, and differentiating rights by sex runs counter to the EU directive. Only indirect measures through social benefits are realistic—and even those carry unpredictable legal consequences. The horizon for more decisive steps begins no earlier than spring 2027.