Volodymyr Zelensky opened 2026 with a series of personnel reshuffles at the top of the political hierarchy, redistributing key roles between the Office of the President and the security bloc.
Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, was transferred to the post of head of the Office of the President, replacing Andriy Yermak, who for nearly six years had remained the central figure of the presidential vertical. The vacated position of GUR chief was taken by Oleh Ivashchenko, who previously led Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service. The second key decision was the appointment of Mykhailo Fedorov as minister of defence: until then he had served as deputy prime minister and minister of digital transformation, while also overseeing state projects in the fields of drones and military technologies. Taken together, these steps signalled an attempt to reformat the system of wartime governance and tighten political control over the security apparatus.
By appointing Fedorov as minister of defence, Volodymyr Zelensky is pursuing two objectives at once.
The first is overtly public in nature. During periods of acute crisis, the president has traditionally resorted to personnel reshuffles as a universal instrument for demonstrating “change”, meant to restore society’s sense of control over events. Against the backdrop of an ongoing and widening corruption scandal that has already touched the Servant of the People faction, this tactic has once again proved expedient. Fedorov fits the role almost perfectly: he is one of the most recognisable officials, enjoys a reputation as a “forward-looking technocrat”, and is directly associated with drones—today perceived as one of Ukraine’s few remaining technological advantages. At least in the short term, this may create a sense of renewal among part of the public. By the same logic, one cannot rule out a possible replacement of Ukraine’s armed forces commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi with a more popular and media-friendly military figure, although such a move would inevitably heighten the risks of politicising the army.
The second objective is far less public, yet no less significant. Fedorov’s appointment as minister of defence can be seen as an attempt to politically weaken a figure who has long aroused unease on Bankova Street because of his ties to grant-funded circles actively involved in amplifying the corruption scandal. As military problems mount, the defence ministry increasingly becomes a “firing-squad” post: sooner or later, its head is likely to be held responsible for systemic failures, regardless of media appeal or managerial competence. Denys Shmyhal avoided this logic only because he remained defence minister for less than six months.
Paradoxically, under the current configuration of power the post of head of the Office of the President—now occupied by Budanov—appears far more advantageous for accumulating political weight than running the defence ministry. In the system constructed by Zelensky, it is precisely the head of the Office who serves as the pivotal figure, overseeing the vertical of power and the security bloc. During Andriy Yermak’s tenure, it was often claimed that he, rather than the president, was effectively running the country. This was an oversimplification: Yermak did not possess political ambitions autonomous from Zelensky and acted exclusively in the president’s interests. Budanov, by contrast, does harbour such ambitions—and on a considerable scale. Should he succeed in concentrating influence over decision-making on a level comparable to that of his predecessor, he risks becoming “Yermak—on steroids”.
Against the backdrop of these reshuffles, the most consequential personnel shift may prove to be the possible dismissal of Maliuk from his post as head of the SBU, rumours of which surfaced on January 2. During his tenure at the security service, Maliuk has emerged as an independent and influential figure, operating very much “on his own terms”—a posture that, among other things, was evident in his refusal in November to carry out Yermak’s order to move against the anti-corruption bodies. At the same time, his relationship with Budanov remains deeply strained. If reports of his dismissal are confirmed and Maliuk is indeed reassigned to a secondary position—such as secretary of the National Security and Defence Council—this could radically alter the balance of power across the entire security bloc.