The joint U.S.-Israeli operation targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—was initially presented as the "complete destruction" of key infrastructure. President Donald Trump personally declared that Tehran’s program had been "wiped off the face of the Earth." But leaks from U.S. intelligence, reported by The New York Times and CNN, cast doubt on that version of events: according to experts, Iran’s enriched uranium had been evacuated in advance, and the underground complexes remained intact. The result was less a demolition than a temporary pause.
Irritated by the skepticism, Trump lashed out at the media and officials, calling them "traitors" and accusing them of trying to downplay the success. The administration was forced to delay its report to Congress, and infighting began within the intelligence community.
Meanwhile, on the other end of the Eurasian continent, Beijing was drawing its own conclusions. The threat of the Strait of Hormuz being closed—through which a significant share of China’s LNG imports flows—prompted Chinese leadership to revisit the idea of Power of Siberia 2, a pipeline that could turn Russia into a major overland gas supplier. This rapprochement is happening amid mutual wariness: Russian intelligence has long viewed China as a potential threat, and the FSB has documented Beijing’s espionage activity in the Russian Far East. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the strikes on Iran makes an energy alliance increasingly likely.
Strikes That Left Questions Behind
In the early hours of June 22, U.S. B-2 strategic bombers and Israeli F-35s carried out strikes on three key sites of Iran’s nuclear program—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The attacks marked the culmination of a decade of tensions over Iranian uranium enrichment, and Washington declared them an unprecedented success. Donald Trump claimed that "Iran’s nuclear facilities have been completely destroyed" and called the operation one of the most successful military actions in U.S. history.
But within 24 hours, The New York Times, citing leaks from intelligence sources, raised doubts: the underground bunkers remained largely intact, the uranium had been evacuated, and the damage was limited to entrance infrastructure and power systems. The overall impact was limited—experts estimated that the program had been delayed by "less than six months."
The gap between official rhetoric and intelligence findings triggered a public dispute. Trump accused CNN and NYT of being "in collusion," calling the sources "anonymous losers." Congressional hearings were postponed to align the messaging of the report, and inside the administration a search began for the "leaker."
While Washington argues over the extent of the damage, Beijing is drawing practical lessons from this new wave of instability. The threat of the Strait of Hormuz being shut down, through which a third of China’s LNG imports pass, prompted China to reassess its energy strategy—and return to the stalled Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project, long delayed due to disagreements with Russia.
Trump Demands Faith—Intelligence Refuses to Confirm
A classified report submitted to Congress several days after the operation confirmed that the underground facilities at Fordow and Isfahan had been only partially damaged. The New York Times reported that Iran’s nuclear program "retained its uranium enrichment capability and could likely restore its pace within months." Intelligence agencies avoided endorsing the White House’s insistence on the project’s "total elimination."
Trump’s rhetoric, by contrast, left no room for doubt. He called the media reports a "setup," equating them with an attack on the success of American pilots. But within the intelligence community, concern is growing: such a sharp divergence between political messaging and actual data could undermine the decision-making process in future crises.
Meanwhile, Israel—despite its public support—has shown restraint: the country’s defense ministry has referred only to "serious damage," without claiming the "elimination" of the entire program. Jerusalem fears that the White House may overestimate the operation’s impact—and withdraw further support.
The Vulnerability of Hormuz and China’s Turn to Land—Beijing Revives Power of Siberia 2
The sharp escalation in the Persian Gulf has made the vulnerability of China’s maritime routes unmistakably clear. According to the consulting firm Rystad Energy, about 30% of China’s natural gas imports come in the form of LNG from Qatar and the UAE—via the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has threatened to close if strikes continue.
Against this backdrop, Chinese sources interviewed by The Wall Street Journal reported a renewed push in high-level consultations on the Power of Siberia 2 project. The pipeline is designed to connect Russia’s Yamal region to western China via Mongolia, with a projected capacity of up to 50 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Until recently, negotiations had stalled over three key issues:
⋅ China insisted on a minimum price close to its domestic tariffs;
⋅ Russia demanded an export premium and high volumes;
⋅ Beijing was wary of excessive dependence on Russia.
The military crisis has changed the calculus: pipeline deliveries are now seen not only as an economic asset but a geopolitical one. Alexander Gabuev of Carnegie China called it "a textbook case of geoeconomic diversification accelerated by military risk."
Closer Ties Despite Suspicion—Russia and China Deepen Energy Partnership Amid Intelligence Friction
For Russia, China’s interest represents an opportunity to regain political and economic footing. The loss of the European market and ongoing technological sanctions have intensified the need for stable hard-currency inflows. Power of Siberia 2 could partly offset the decline in exports to the EU—even if that means Moscow will have to make pricing concessions.
But closer ties do not eliminate distrust. Russia’s FSB considers China one of its top intelligence adversaries, citing instances of technology theft in the Russian Far East and defense sector. A latent conflict of interest persists between the two countries—especially in the Arctic and Central Asia.
Nevertheless, amid renewed confrontation with the West, the Kremlin is doubling down on alignment with Beijing—even if it comes at the cost of growing dependence. "The risks are clear, but there are no alternatives," said a former Russian Energy Ministry official in a private conversation.
What Happens Next If the Failure to Destroy Iran’s Nuclear Program Is Confirmed?
Hypothetical Scenarios
Moscow and Beijing Accelerate Talks on Power of Siberia 2
The Russian leadership will seek to lock in a deal with Beijing as quickly as possible—even if it means offering price concessions. The pipeline provides Moscow with "political insurance" and a stable flow of hard currency amid Western sanctions.
U.S. Congress Increases Pressure on Intelligence Community
American lawmakers may demand the release of a declassified version of the intelligence report and hold hearings with Pentagon and Israeli intelligence officials to reconcile conflicting assessments of the strike’s outcome.
Tehran Moves to Prove Its Nuclear Program Survived
Iran may publicly restart centrifuges or announce an increase in its uranium stockpile in an effort to refute claims of "destruction." Such a move would carry the risk of renewed escalation and potential follow-up strikes.
Beijing Ramps Up Purchases of Russian Energy
Even before final pipeline contracts are signed, China may begin aggressively buying Russian oil and gas at discounted rates—seeking to lock in strategic advantage amid instability in the Persian Gulf.
Washington Faces a Strategic Crossroads
The U.S. will have to decide whether to maintain pressure on Russia through sanctions—which could drive it deeper into China’s orbit—or adopt a more flexible strategy aimed at preventing a durable energy alliance between Moscow and Beijing.
Consequences in Balance: Short-Term Gains and Strategic Risks for Key Players
The aftermath of the strike has not been evenly distributed: some states gained tactical or economic advantages, while others now face new risks. Below is a comparison of short-term effects and medium-term costs for four major players.
What the Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure Meant for Washington, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing
Actor
Short-Term Effect
Medium-Term Risk
U.S.
Show of force, but questions over effectiveness; reputational dispute.
Strengthening of the Moscow-Beijing bloc; rising oil prices.
Iran
Infrastructure losses, but not of the program itself.
Risk of renewed strikes; deepening economic isolation.
Russia
Opportunity to substitute EU market with gas exports to China.
Growing dependence on China; risk of price dumping.
China
Import diversification; strategic leverage over the U.S. and Gulf suppliers.
Pushback from Washington and the EU; accusations of illicit intelligence activity.
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