Trump Sees Turkey as a Mediator and Potential Partner in Resolving the Gaza Conflict

For nearly two decades, Turkey has cultivated ties with Hamas, a relationship that has long irritated several regional powers. Yet in recent weeks, Ankara has received generous praise from Donald Trump for using those same connections to pressure the group and help secure a ceasefire agreement with Israel.

Washington’s vision of Turkey’s role in implementing Trump’s peace plan, however, has caused deep unease among Israeli officials. In Jerusalem, Ankara is seen as an ally of Islamist movements hostile to Israel and as one of its chief rivals for influence in the Middle East.

Disagreements over Turkey’s potential role in Gaza’s reconstruction and in broader international stabilization efforts have become one of the main obstacles to advancing the peace process. After being largely excluded from earlier ceasefire negotiations, Ankara is now eager to secure a diplomatic victory by helping achieve the release of all living hostages still held by Hamas—one of the key conditions of the current truce. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said that Turkey intends to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza and bears a “special responsibility” for its reconstruction. He has also not ruled out the participation of Turkish troops in stabilization forces.

Analysts closely following Turkish politics say Ankara’s involvement would strengthen its ties with Washington and reinforce Turkey’s image as a major diplomatic player. A more active role would also bolster Erdoğan’s standing with his conservative base as a leader of the Muslim world.

The prospect of a Turkish presence in Gaza, however, has alarmed Israel, where officials fear it would bring unfriendly forces to the country’s doorstep. “The idea of Turks and their affiliated organizations entering Gaza drives Israelis crazy, given how much effort has gone into preventing it,” said Michael Milshtein, a former head of the Palestinian Affairs Department in Israeli military intelligence. “They are not considered an enemy, but they are clearly not Israel’s partners either.”

The Middle East has undergone major shifts after two years of conflict. Beyond the war with Hamas, Israeli strikes on Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, as well as the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, have weakened Tehran and created new openings for Ankara’s rise. Erdoğan has managed to build a warm personal rapport with Donald Trump despite his long-standing ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement from which Hamas emerged nearly forty years ago.

“If we finally get rid of Iran and Hezbollah, only to see Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood take over Gaza, that would be extremely dangerous,” warned former Israeli ambassador to the United States Michael Oren.

Israeli politicians and diplomats, both publicly and privately, have urged the United States to block any Turkish presence in the enclave. They have repeatedly stressed that their “American friends” share these concerns. “Israel will determine which forces are unacceptable to us… and that naturally suits the United States,” said Benjamin Netanyahu, responding to Israeli military warnings about Turkey’s potential participation in Gaza operations.

During a visit to Israel last month, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said Washington “will not impose foreign troops on our Israeli friends’ territory,” but added that Turkey “can play a constructive role and already has, for which we are very grateful.” He dismissed questions about Ankara’s past ties to Hamas, saying that “the path to peace lies in the future, not the past.”

The Turkish Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Friday that discussions on forming stabilization forces for Gaza are “already underway” and confirmed that Turkish military officials “are meeting with their counterparts to determine what should happen and in what format a military unit could be established.”

According to Michael Milshtein, a former Israeli military intelligence officer, Turkey’s ties with Hamas have become particularly visible over the past two years. Ankara has hosted members of the movement released as part of prisoner exchanges for Israeli hostages. He estimates that at least several dozen militants have settled in Turkey, among them Abdel Nasser Issa—one of the founders of Hamas’s military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and a key architect of suicide bombing tactics.

For many years, Turkey has allowed Hamas representatives to live or temporarily reside on its territory, which has long irritated the United States and other Western countries. In 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department stated that more than $500 million in Hamas assets were held in companies operating in Turkey and four other Arab states.

According to Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, despite Ankara’s political support for the Palestinian cause, Turkey has not allowed Hamas to establish a military or financial infrastructure on its territory capable of supporting attacks against Israel. “Turkey generally tries not to cross that line,” she noted.

Israeli officials, however, argue that any form of support for Hamas ultimately strengthens its military capacity.

Before Hamas’s assault on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, relations between Ankara and Jerusalem had been gradually improving, particularly in trade. But after the war began, Erdoğan became one of the fiercest critics of Israel’s campaign in Gaza, and last year Turkey joined South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. The Turkish president has consistently described Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement and, even after the October 7 attacks, reiterated that it is an “organization of liberation.”

At the outset of the war, Ankara offered itself as a mediator. However, according to an Arab diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity, its role was minimized by both the Biden administration and most Arab states.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has opened new opportunities for Turkey, analysts say. During his first term, relations between the two countries were far more strained: Washington expelled Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program and blocked aircraft deliveries after Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 missile defense system. That decision, explained Sinan Ülgen, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and director of the Istanbul-based think tank EDAM, “created a serious limitation for the Turkish Air Force, which never gained access to fifth-generation stealth technology.”

Erdoğan’s involvement in advancing the U.S.-backed cease-fire plan has improved Washington’s perception of Turkey, though the question of Ankara’s readmission to the F-35 program remained unresolved after his September meeting with Trump.

From Turkey’s perspective, its involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction appears logical: Turkish construction firms rank among the world’s leading international contractors and have decades of experience in large-scale infrastructure projects. They also specialize in post-earthquake debris clearance, making them particularly well-suited for work in Gaza, where the destruction is immense. The volume of reconstruction investments is expected to reach many billions of dollars, and such contracts could prove extremely lucrative.

On the ground in Gaza, the Turkish humanitarian organization IHH has become increasingly active. It has long been banned in Israel over alleged ties to terrorist groups. The organization shares photos and videos of aid deliveries prominently featuring Turkish flags. According to Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a Turkey expert at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center, this is “a deliberate effort to visually cement Turkey’s presence in Gaza.”

IHH rejects allegations of extremist links. The organization’s deputy director, Mustafa Özbek, told reporters that Israel’s accusations began after the 2010 incident in which Israeli forces stormed an aid flotilla organized by IHH. The episode triggered a diplomatic crisis between Ankara and Jerusalem.