Trump Is Everywhere in Global Politics

Exactly one year after Trump’s return to the White House, a growing number of countries around the world sense that, in the coming years, the role of the leading superpower is more likely to pass not to the United States but to China. The American president’s hardline style and his demonstrative disregard for democratic norms and international law have been interpreted outside the United States as a signal to move closer to Beijing. The authors of the ECFR report note that attitudes toward the Global West are becoming increasingly wary, while Washington’s traditional geopolitical adversaries feel progressively less intimidated by the United States. At the same time, America’s allies are alarmed by White House actions they perceive as predatory and unpredictable.

According to the analysts, the deepening rift within the Western community is clearly reflected in how events are assessed beyond the United States. Sociological data show that, as of late 2025, Russia more often identifies the European Union—not the United States—as the primary source of hostility.

In Ukraine, by contrast, primary hopes are now pinned on Brussels rather than Washington. A majority of Europeans believe it is necessary to strengthen their own military capabilities, increasingly viewing the United States as a less reliable ally. There is also widespread concern that an invasion of Venezuela could be interpreted by Russia and China as a signal that the violent division of the world into spheres of influence is acceptable.

Surveys also record a decline in anxiety about China and a growing willingness to cooperate between the PRC and other states. This aligns with the foreign-policy and ideological course pursued by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has placed his bet on expanding China’s influence beyond the Global West and developing partnership ties with those countries. In many societies, there is a widespread belief that this strategy will prove successful and that China’s global position will strengthen markedly over the next ten years. Among the factors most often cited as capable of accelerating this process, respondents most frequently point to technological development. In EU countries, around 60% of those surveyed are confident that China will become the world leader in electric vehicle production. In the United States and Europe alike, there is also an expectation that the PRC will achieve the greatest success in the field of renewable energy.

Another notable trend is that over the past year hypothetical Chinese dominance is increasingly no longer perceived as an unequivocally negative scenario. China is viewed as a geopolitical adversary primarily in Ukraine and South Korea. In many other countries—including Brazil, India, and South Africa—the share of those who instead see China as an ally or at least a necessary partner increased over the course of 2025.

Expectations of improved relations with Beijing in the coming years are also evident in both Russia and Turkey. On this basis, political scientists suggest that Xi Jinping’s proclaimed course toward a multipolar world may, in practice, result in global Chinese dominance—a scenario that a significant number of countries outside the Global West appear willing to accept with little resistance.

Surveys indicate that in China, Russia, EU countries, Ukraine, and even within the United States itself, only a small minority expect American power to strengthen in the coming years. At the same time, most respondents agree that the United States will retain substantial influence despite China’s rising role. Even so, participants in the study are convinced that Washington will act less and less as the leader of the Global West and more and more as a standalone superpower guided primarily by its own interests.

It is precisely this perception, analysts argue, that has become one of the reasons for the sharp deterioration in attitudes toward the United States within the European Union. In EU countries, around 20% of respondents describe the United States as an enemy or adversary, and in a number of states this figure approaches 30%. ECFR experts link this dynamic to the aggressive and confrontational rhetoric of the Trump administration.

The most illustrative example is the speech delivered by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025. On that occasion, he sharply criticized European policy, accusing EU countries of “retreating from fundamental values” and of allowing the mass entry of “unvetted immigrants.”

The authors of the report note that just a year earlier, outside Europe—with the exception of South Korea—Trump’s victory in the presidential election was generally viewed positively, and his return to the White House was associated with the prospect of improved international relations.

However, these expectations quickly dissipated. In India, 84% of respondents in 2024 considered the victory of the Republican candidate to be beneficial for their country, but just a year later the share of such responses fell to 53%. In South Africa, a majority preferred the United States to China in September 2023, but the situation subsequently changed radically—South Africans now largely orient themselves toward closer ties with Beijing rather than Washington. As ECFR researchers note, the actions of the American president are increasingly criticized not only in the EU and South Korea, but also across Asia and Africa.

At the same time, respondents in Ukraine, Turkey, and China indicate that under Trump the United States has become an “ordinary” superpower. Washington no longer demands that other countries choose between democracies and autocracies, as was the case under the previous administration of Joe Biden.

Against this backdrop, many survey participants consider likely a scenario in which their countries can maintain functional relations simultaneously with both the United States and China. This approach is described as realistic in Russia, South Africa, Brazil, Turkey, India, and South Korea. Compared with surveys conducted two years ago, belief has strengthened in these countries that a multipolar world will offer greater freedom in choosing partners without the need to side with one of the two superpowers. Optimism about their countries’ futures is expressed by 73% of respondents in India, 72% in China, 58% in Ukraine, and 48% in Russia. At the same time, in Ukraine and Russia these sentiments largely depend on the outcome of the war.

Another trend highlighted by ECFR analysts concerns perceptions of the European Union. It is increasingly viewed as an independent global actor, distinct from the United States. This is especially pronounced in Russia, where EU countries are now more frequently named as the principal adversaries.

At the same time, attitudes toward Washington within Russia have softened noticeably over the past year. Whereas two years ago 64% of Russians viewed the United States as an adversary, that figure fell to 48% in early 2025—and now stands at 37%. At the same time, researchers stress that no comparable shift has occurred within the United States itself—both Republicans and Democrats continue to perceive Russia as an enemy.

According to ECFR analysts, the responses of Russian respondents—around half of those surveyed—largely reflect Moscow’s official line: Vladimir Putin and his inner circle regard the European Union, above all, as the principal adversary. In China, attitudes toward the EU are different—it is seen as a potential partner in an emerging multipolar world, where Europe is no longer obliged to act in lockstep with the White House. This helps explain the survey results: 45% of respondents in China describe the United States as their country’s adversary, while nearly as many—46%—do not classify the European Union as an enemy, but as a partner. Overall, 61% of Chinese respondents consider the United States a threat, compared with just 19% who say the same of the EU.

The views of Ukrainian respondents are almost a mirror image of those expressed in Russia. Whereas two years ago a majority of Ukrainians named Washington as their main ally, around two-thirds now expect further rapprochement with the European Union. Only one-third of respondents anticipate stronger ties with the United States. The EU is seen as an ally by 39% of Ukrainians, while just 18% name the United States—down from 27% a year earlier.

Within the United States itself, a substantial share of the public does not support Donald Trump’s course. There, 40% of respondents unequivocally described the European Union as an ally of America. The statement that European security is inseparable from American security was endorsed by 49% of those surveyed, while only 29% disagreed. In Europe, the picture is different: only 25% of Britons and 16% of respondents in EU countries regard the United States as an ally of Washington.

Most Europeans view the prospect of a transition to a multipolar world—one in which Western countries lose their dominance—rather negatively. Survey data place EU citizens among the most pessimistic populations globally. Only 21% believe in a positive future for themselves personally, 49% for their country, and 51% for the world as a whole. Nearly half of respondents doubt that the European Union will be able to conduct relations with the United States and China on equal terms.

At the same time, survey participants from South Africa, Brazil, China, and Ukraine tend to view the EU as a stronger actor than Europeans themselves do. This bleak perception of Europe’s own role is likely influenced by the disparaging rhetoric of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, which is actively echoed within the European Union by right-wing populist forces.

Judging by the responses, EU citizens would like to see greater firmness from their leaders in relations with the United States. They do not expect a close partnership with Washington and, for that very reason, more than half of those surveyed support strengthening military capabilities. In addition, 40% of Europeans fear a possible Russian invasion of their country, while 57% are concerned about a large-scale war involving nuclear weapons.

Summing up the findings of the study, ECFR experts note that the United States’ turn toward isolationism has significantly altered the global balance of power. China’s influence has grown, and outside Europe and North America a multipolar future without a single global leader is viewed with optimism, while within the European Union scenarios of a future without stable arrangements with Washington are increasingly being discussed.

European leaders now face a series of complex challenges. It remains unclear whether they will be able to secure a safe and free future for Ukraine without allowing a peace imposed on Russia’s terms. At the same time, they must decide whether closer ties with China are desirable, whether a new Western alliance can be formed, and how to confront several types of threats simultaneously—a military threat from Russia, an economic one from the PRC, and a political one from the United States.