The SCO Summit Took Place in Tianjin

Western observers broadly agree that the summit is largely symbolic: Beijing seeks to present it as a show of unity among Global South countries in opposition to U.S. “hegemony.” This theme—though without directly naming Washington—was central to the speeches of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin during the expanded session on September 1.

Xi declared that “global governance models are at a crossroads” and proposed building “a fairer and more equitable system of global governance,” where all states “regardless of size, strength, or wealth” would have an equal say in decision-making. How this approach differs from the principles of the UN, he did not clarify. “We must continue to take a firm stand against hegemony and power politics and uphold genuine multipolarity,” the Chinese leader said.

Speaking next, Vladimir Putin endorsed the initiative and stressed that the SCO could play a leading role in shaping a new architecture of global governance. He argued that China’s proposals are especially relevant at a time when “some countries still refuse to abandon their pursuit of dominance in international affairs.”

In Tianjin, Putin devoted significant attention to the war in Ukraine, repeating the claim that the crisis was the result of “a coup in Ukraine, backed and provoked by the West,” as well as “constant attempts to draw Ukraine into NATO,” which he said threatened Russia’s security.

Yet the summit discussions were not limited to ideological statements. The agenda also featured a substantial economic component, even though the SCO was originally created as a security coordination body rather than an economic bloc. Xi Jinping announced the creation of a development bank under the organization’s umbrella to provide loans to member states, and outlined plans to expand cooperation in energy.

Putin, for his part, called for reforming the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, arguing for the need “to end the use of finance as an instrument of neocolonialism.”

Relations between India and China have long been fraught due to the Tibet question and disputed stretches of their border. Tensions peaked after a series of clashes in 2020 that left several dozen soldiers dead in frontier areas. A tentative thaw came only after the BRICS summit in Kazan last year, where Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping met in person for the first time in five years.

Two weeks before the current summit in Tianjin, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India, and the two sides announced the creation of working groups on border demarcation. Around the same time, Beijing lifted export restrictions on a number of Indian goods.

Modi’s visit to China was his first in seven years. On the opening day of the summit, he held talks with Xi Jinping, after which the two leaders announced the resumption of direct flights, suspended during the pandemic. Xi, stressing a new phase in the relationship, declared that “the time has come for the elephant and the dragon to dance together,” and that the two countries would henceforth see each other not as rivals but as partners.

The Indian prime minister’s trip, however, took place against the backdrop of a sharp cooling in ties between New Delhi and Washington. Donald Trump first imposed 25 percent tariffs on Indian goods as part of his trade war, and then added another 25 percent, citing India’s purchases of Russian oil.

Initially the American president had threatened sanctions against all buyers of Russian energy if Moscow refused a ceasefire in Ukraine. But after a personal meeting with Vladimir Putin he effectively abandoned the ultimatum, saying an immediate truce was no longer required, though he still went ahead with the additional tariffs on India.

According to Reuters, in just a few months in the White House Trump managed to inflict serious damage on “decades of carefully built relations” between the U.S. and India—ties Washington had counted on as a counterweight to Beijing. The Times notes that, unlike authoritarian Russia and China, India remains a democracy traditionally close to the West, and Trump’s reckless policies could alienate from the U.S. “a potential ally of immense value” for years to come.

The summit in Tianjin concludes on September 2, and on September 3 Beijing will host large-scale celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. The central event will be a military parade in Tiananmen Square. The highest-ranking guest will be Vladimir Putin (a mirror image of Moscow’s May 9 parade, where Xi Jinping was the guest of honor). Leaders from several countries, including North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, are also expected to attend. No Western officials are on the guest list.

Analysts cited by The Guardian stress that the timing alongside the summit is no coincidence. The parade is designed as a symbol of China’s strength and leadership, aimed at uniting Global South countries in opposition to Western dominance. They note that Beijing only began officially commemorating the war’s end a decade ago, and did so then on a far smaller scale. The scale of this year’s event, along with the presence of many Asian leaders, is intended to underscore new alliances and send a political message to the West.

As The Washington Post observes, the parade comes amid China’s revision of military history: the U.S. role in defeating Japan is being gradually downplayed in official rhetoric, while greater emphasis is placed on the contributions of China itself and the Soviet Union.