On July 14, Donald Trump warned that unless a ceasefire is reached in Ukraine within 50 days, he will impose 100% tariffs on imports to the United States. The threat targets not so much Russia—whose trade with the U.S. is already minimal—but countries that continue to buy Russian oil, primarily China, India, and Turkey. These secondary measures could hit key U.S. partners and destabilize global markets. But how realistic is such a scenario? What would it mean for global trade and energy security if Trump follows through? And why have even the toughest sanctions failed to push Russian oil off the market? Carnegie Russia Eurasia senior fellow Sergey Vakulenko explains.
Sergey Vakulenko, a senior fellow at the Berlin-based Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, is skeptical about the effectiveness of sanctions on Russian oil exports. In his view, even the most dramatic statements from Washington—including Trump’s threat of secondary tariffs—run up against hard limits, both technical and political.
If Trump’s remarks are interpreted in line with Senator Lindsey Graham’s proposed legislation, they imply 500% tariffs on any country continuing to buy Russian oil. That includes China, India, and Turkey, as well as, to a lesser extent, Hungary, Slovakia, and even Saudi Arabia, which purchases Russian fuel oil for its power plants. But as Vakulenko points out, the real question is not how these countries might respond, but whether Washington can actually follow through.
"Let’s say Putin digs in and Trump feels compelled to act. Logically, this would mean 100% tariffs on imports from China, India, and Turkey. Yet each of these countries has already been engaged in sensitive tariff negotiations with the U.S.," the expert notes.
With China, for example, the U.S. is already locked in a protracted trade conflict, with many tariffs reaching absurd levels. The situation with India is similar. And while relations with Turkey are complicated, it remains a key U.S. ally in the Middle East and a mediator in issues like Syria. Picking a fight with Ankara over Russia would weaken Washington's position in an already fragile region.
Vakulenko also notes that Graham’s bill would make such tariffs automatic, stripping the president of flexibility: "It’s what negotiation theory calls a ‘commitment device’—a way of signaling you’re serious about going all the way. That’s precisely why Trump called the initiative pointless: he doesn’t want to be locked into someone else’s script."
Replacing Russian Oil Is Not Feasible
Even if U.S. allies agreed to stop purchasing Russian oil, there simply isn’t enough supply on the global market to replace it. According to Vakulenko, despite promises from OPEC+ countries to ramp up production, the pace of quota rollbacks remains below expectations. Saudi Arabia, one of the key players, has already shown that it cannot quickly scale up exports.
"What we can say for sure is that no one has enough oil to fully replace Russian exports," he notes.
Moreover, even a partial reduction in Russian oil on the market could trigger a sharp rise in prices. That makes the threat of secondary sanctions highly sensitive—not just for those still trading with Moscow, but for consumers around the world.
Price Cap and Logistics: Dead-End Scenarios
If Trump does decide to act, the question remains: what exactly can he do? As Vakulenko points out, the Biden administration failed to limit the Kremlin’s revenues without creating shortages in the market. In theory, Trump could try to enforce the price cap mechanism—for example, by blacklisting all tankers that have carried Russian oil.
But in practice, that would mean sidelining a significant share of the global tanker fleet. "These vessels don’t just carry Russian oil. Today it’s from Russia, tomorrow it’s from the UAE.
Undermining this system would hurt everyone, not just Moscow," the expert stresses.
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Sanctions Work for Three Weeks
As for the Biden administration’s latest sanctions package—described as the most "forceful" to date—its impact proved short-lived. According to Vakulenko, the discount on Russian oil widened, shipping costs rose, and exporters’ revenues declined. But within three weeks, the trend began to reverse: loopholes emerged, tankers returned to operation, and logistics adjusted.
Vakulenko argues it would be wrong to call sanctions entirely ineffective—they do create obstacles, limit market access, and concentrate exports among a narrower group of countries. But "sand in the gears" is not the same as a full blockade. Russia’s oil exports have not been fundamentally disrupted.
What About Iran?
Iran is often cited as a potential alternative. However, Vakulenko notes that even if relations with the West were to thaw, ramping up Iranian exports would take years. Ongoing sanctions instability, fears of another Trump-style reversal, and weak infrastructure all make Iran unprepared to replace Russia.
Today, Tehran exports around 1.8 to 1.9 million barrels per day. In theory, it could add another half million. But that’s still a fraction of Russia’s output. "Compared to the five million barrels Russia ships daily, it’s a drop in the ocean," Vakulenko concludes.