In early June, Poland held the second round of its presidential election. With a razor-thin margin of 50.89%, the winner was Karol Nawrocki, an independent candidate with conservative and Euroskeptic views. His opponent, pro-European politician Rafał Trzaskowski—the mayor of Warsaw and deputy head of the Civic Platform party—received 49.11%. The tense campaign reflected the deep polarization of Polish society, which has intensified in recent years.
Former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski shares his views on the outcome of the vote, the risk of an institutional crisis, the future of Polish–Ukrainian relations, the Volhynia massacre, Vladimir Putin, and the prospects for democracy in Russia. Kwaśniewski led Poland from 1995 to 2005, championed its accession to NATO and the EU, and played a key role in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. In the 2000s, he met personally with Vladimir Putin and, as he recalls, heard from him a direct promise to "restore a great Russia".
This interview was conducted by Polish journalist Viktoria Bieliaszyn and originally published by Meduza. We summarize its key points below, preserving the structure, facts, and direct quotes.
Poland Remains Deeply Divided: The Outcome Was Not a Rightward Shift but a Coincidence
According to Kwaśniewski, Nawrocki’s victory came as no surprise. Polish society is almost evenly split, and nearly every election in recent years has confirmed this. The high turnout—over 70%—underscores the level of political tension.
"I’m disappointed, but not surprised," he admitted, adding that the 360,000-vote margin is not enough to describe the outcome as a rightward shift. In his view, Trzaskowski lost not only because of polarization but also due to campaign missteps: neglecting young male voters, failing to offer a clear message on social mobility, and facing opposition from former president Andrzej Duda, who is aligned with the right.
Kwaśniewski emphasizes that Poland is still far from becoming another Budapest. Nawrocki may hold the presidency, but the parliament remains pro-European, and Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government is firmly committed to EU integration. Still, he warns of two and a half years of institutional conflict ahead.
Poland’s Electorate Is Drifting Right—Especially Young Men. Progressive Issues Trigger Backlash
According to Kwaśniewski, one of the key reasons for the pro-European camp’s failure was the shift in attitudes among young men. This demographic played a major role in boosting far-right candidates like Sławomir Mentzen and Grzegorz Braun. "Had Trzaskowski offered concrete proposals—on employment, on housing—the result might have been different," Kwaśniewski believes. But nothing substantial was presented.
He also points to a paradox in the push for women’s rights. On one hand, the feminist struggle for equality is justified and necessary. On the other, it fuels mobilization among conservative male voters. "I don’t know how it is in Russia, but in Poland today, more women than men are educated. Women have greater potential," says the former president, adding that the future of political contest will depend largely on who can better harness new media and reach both camps.
Poland remains divided, he emphasizes: the country’s east leans more conservative, the west more liberal. "This conflict will continue. It won’t end anytime soon."
Attitudes Toward Ukraine Are Shifting, but Hostility Is Politically Manufactured—Not Widespread
Kwaśniewski describes the rhetoric of Nawrocki and Mentzen on Ukraine as overtly cynical. Slogans like "We care about Poland, not Ukraine" were calculated to gain 2–3% of the vote—enough to swing a close race. A similar logic, he says, underpinned the farmers’ protests at the border: "Ukrainian agriculture is simply more competitive than ours. But the EU can develop mechanisms to integrate Ukraine without harming European producers."
Kwaśniewski regrets that pro-Russian narratives are gaining traction in some circles. Yet he stresses that 80% of Ukrainians living in Poland work and pay taxes—more than they receive in benefits. The early months of the war, he says, marked a moment of extraordinary solidarity: "It exceeded all my expectations. People waited at the border for refugees and welcomed them into their homes."
Yes, fatigue has set in—particularly around healthcare and social assistance. But the former president insists that resentment toward Ukrainians is largely confined to the supporters of Mentzen and Braun, not the general population.
Historical Memory and Political Timing: How to Talk About Volhynia Without Undermining the Alliance
Volodymyr Zelensky’s congratulations to Nawrocki included a reference to "unresolved historical issues," sparking renewed debate in Poland over the Volhynia massacre. Kwaśniewski confirms: "The level of awareness in Poland and Ukraine is vastly different. In Ukraine, the topic was taboo. In Poland, it’s part of our collective memory."
Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leonid Kuchma
He emphasizes that exhumations and acknowledgment of the tragedy are necessary, but must be approached with tact: "Without theatrics. The victims and their families deserve that." In his view, Ukrainian society must gain access to information about the scale of the crimes, while the Polish side must show empathy and understand the situation Ukraine finds itself in today.
"We must not exaggerate our own suffering from 80 years ago, when every day in Ukraine new victims of Russian aggression appear," Kwaśniewski says. If a language of reconciliation can be found, it will be a meaningful political and moral achievement.
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Ukraine Must Join the EU and NATO. Any Other Position Is a Historic Mistake
Kwaśniewski sharply criticizes Polish politicians who oppose Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. He calls such a stance "a major historical mistake" and stresses that even if other countries withdraw their support, Poland must stand firm. "A sovereign, independent Ukraine is a guarantee of our security. Even if NATO accepts only the territory currently under Ukrainian control."
He warns that if the narrative of abandoning Ukraine prevails in Poland, the country risks losing all allied support. "Do you want to see Putin at the banks of the Bug River?" he asks critics. Russia launched this war to install a puppet government in Kyiv—and has yet to abandon that goal.
Kwaśniewski calls Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU not just a foreign policy decision, but an existential issue for Europe. "Europe needs Ukraine—not only as a buffer, but as part of its security architecture. Especially now, with an indecisive Donald Trump in the White House."
Zelensky Passed the Test of War—But Faces an Even Greater Challenge Ahead
Aleksander Kwaśniewski acknowledges that Volodymyr Zelensky entered politics almost by accident—as an outsider. But in wartime, he has proven himself a capable leader. "The phrase 'I need ammunition, not a ride' will go down in history," he says. Zelensky managed to keep the government functioning and maintain national unity.
The former Polish president especially praises Zelensky’s communication skills: in the first two years of the war, his speeches—both to Ukrainians and the international community—were consistently precise and timely. But now, Kwaśniewski notes, the situation is harder: the war has dragged on, and public fatigue is growing.
He sees the next phase as even more demanding: after the war, Ukraine must not only rebuild but also return to democracy through elections, despite the wartime centralization of power. "I hope they succeed. Perhaps Ukraine needs a one-term government of national consensus—for security and institutional recovery."
He warns that Russia will try to meddle in future Ukrainian elections—through candidates, propaganda, and disinformation. Yet Ukraine’s civil society, he argues, is far stronger and more organized than Russia’s. "Ukrainians today have such a strong sense of identity that they won’t let anyone take away their state or their freedom."
Putin Spoke of a "Great Russia" in the Early 2000s. After the Orange Revolution, He Saw Kwaśniewski as an Enemy
Kwaśniewski recalls that his early meetings with Vladimir Putin in the 2000s were relatively open. "That was Putin 1.0. Now we’re dealing with version 5.0," he quips. The turning point came after the Orange Revolution, in which Kwaśniewski served as a mediator. Ukraine’s pro-Western shift, Yushchenko’s victory, and international recognition of electoral fraud led to a sharp deterioration in relations.
Vladimir Putin and Aleksander Kwaśniewski
After 2005, Kwaśniewski says, his conversations with Putin became "unpleasant." Putin openly accused Poland of "interference" and compared the Ukrainian crisis to a struggle between empires. "I told him: this is absurd. Poland is not an empire. We just want Ukraine to decide for itself whom to align with. He didn’t accept that."
As early as 2002—well before the Munich speech—Putin had told Kwaśniewski directly that he wanted two things: to strengthen Russia’s global position and to restore a great Russia. At the time, it sounded like the ambition of a young leader. But over time, it became clear that this was a fixed ideology driving him toward war.
"He calls Ukrainians brothers and sisters—then orders their cities to be bombed. Ukrainians will never forgive him," the former president says.
Russia Will Not Become Democratic. Even After Putin, It Will Remain an Empire
According to Kwaśniewski, the West spent too long believing in the possibility of rapprochement with Russia—especially Germany, which placed its bets on trade and economic ties as a pathway to democratization. But that logic failed: the Kremlin used openness to expand its influence, not to reform. Even today, despite the war, some Western leaders remain naïve. "Some still want dialogue. But how can you talk when the bombings continue every day?"
He allows for the possibility of a post-Putin "thaw"—a softer tone and attempts to break isolation. But he does not expect lasting democratization. Even if the war is frozen, he says, Russia will use the pause to regroup and will continue to pursue its old goals: control over Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus.
"Russia will never be democratic in the way we understand democracy. The only question is whether it will one day respect basic human rights and international law. Today, it does neither."
As long as NATO exists, Kwaśniewski believes, the threat of a Russian invasion of Poland or another alliance country is unlikely. "Putin couldn’t even take Ukraine. How would he manage against NATO?"
Still, he cautions against complacency. Russia remains a threat, and imperial thinking runs deep—not just among elites, but across society. "Our history teaches us: Russia’s imperial tendencies know no bounds."
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