Russia’s Oil Tax Take Will Double in April-to $9 Billion

Russia’s main oil levy—the mineral extraction tax (MET)—will amount to about 700 billion rubles ($9 billion) in April, according to Reuters calculations. That is twice the March level (327 billion rubles) and roughly 10% higher than in April last year. The ruble price of Urals averaged $77 a barrel in March—73% above February’s $44.59 and well above the $59 assumed in the budget.

The surge was driven by the war with Iran. US-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of global oil and LNG supplies pass. Traders say this has triggered the sharpest energy crisis in the modern history of the oil market. Brent prices climbed well above $100 a barrel. In late March and early April, Urals traded in the $100-115 per barrel range.

For the budget, it is an unexpected windfall. Russia drafted its 2026 budget on the assumption of $59 a barrel. By the estimate of Sergei Vakulenko, an analyst at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, every $10 increase in the average monthly price of Urals brings the treasury about $1.63 billion in additional tax revenue—around 134 billion rubles. At current prices, that amounts to an extra $8-9 billion a month. “So far, the oil price—and Urals in particular—has risen by more than $60 a barrel. That is nearly $9 billion for the state each month. It is highly significant,” he told CNBC.

Moscow has already abandoned its planned budget cuts. According to Bloomberg, the government is unlikely to make any substantial downgrade to its GDP growth forecast of 1.3%, and part of the oil windfall may be used to finance the war in Ukraine. Military spending for 2026 is budgeted at 12.9 trillion rubles. If Urals averages $75-80 over the year, additional budget revenues could reach 3-4 trillion rubles compared with the baseline forecast.

The United States has indirectly amplified Moscow’s oil gains: the White House issued 30-day waivers to several countries allowing them to buy Russian oil already at sea—in an attempt to ease global prices. As a result, India, which had only shortly before been cutting purchases of Russian crude, increased imports again.

Even so, this stroke of oil luck has hard limits. By the end of the first quarter of 2026, Russia’s budget deficit had reached 4.58 trillion rubles (1.9% of GDP)—meaning nearly the entire annual target had been used up in just three months. In January and February, when oil was cheap, oil-and-gas revenues fell 47% year on year. Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure are reducing production and export volumes. And a possible US-Iran agreement could quickly return Iranian oil to the market and send prices sharply lower.

Analysts warn that the current windfall may help Russia stabilize its economy, but not transform it. Inflation remains high, and so do interest rates: the central bank is holding them at 15%. Labor shortages, the war-driven distortion of the economy, and rising food prices have not gone away. This oil spike does not solve Russia’s structural problems—it merely gives Moscow some breathing room.