Three years and eight months of war have transformed the Russian army from a cumbersome, inefficient structure into a system capable of rapid adaptation and learning. Moscow has built a network of institutions that turn battlefield experience into new technologies, tactics, and organizational solutions.
This evolution has not made the Russian army invincible, but it has shown that it has learned how to learn—and that may be its most significant achievement. To ignore this fact, or to accuse those who acknowledge it of harboring pro-Russian sympathies, is to willfully turn a blind eye to a growing threat.
The history of Russia’s war against Ukraine has been a succession of shattered expectations. In the early months of the invasion, Ukraine’s allies saw Russia as an unstoppable force capable of swiftly crushing Kyiv. But the offensive stalled, and Russian troops were pushed back. Soon after, the opposite belief took hold—that the Russian army had decayed and was on the verge of collapse. That, too, proved mistaken: Ukraine’s counteroffensives fell short, and Moscow returned to a slow but steady advance.
Now, Kyiv’s setbacks are increasingly attributed not to Russian strength but to the erosion of Western support. Yet what remains underestimated is the extent to which Russia has managed to overhaul its military system, learning from its own defeats.
Since 2022, Moscow has been building a comprehensive infrastructure for studying and disseminating battlefield experience. By early 2023, an ecosystem had emerged that brought together the defense industry, universities, research institutes, and military structures. The process has been institutionalized: knowledge gathered on the front lines is systematically organized, while enterprises and research centers are reshaped to meet the needs of the war. Technology startups are granted access to state resources and contracts, becoming part of the defense apparatus.
The result has been a faster pace of adaptation. Russia has learned to use drones more effectively for reconnaissance and strikes, upgraded its armored vehicles and assault tactics, and developed new types of missiles. Junior commanders have been granted greater autonomy, and military training programs are updated in real time. Together, these changes have turned the Russian army into an organization capable not only of surviving but of evolving—preparing for future wars where technological superiority will be decisive.
How Russia Built a Learning System
In the first months of the war, Russian units learned to survive on the move—reinforcing armor, improving camouflage, and experimenting with small assault groups. Soldiers shared their experiences through messaging apps and improvised manuals. This chaotic process became the first stage of adaptation. Later, Moscow began turning it into a structured system.
Since late 2022, officers and researchers have been dispatched to forward command posts to document the details of combat operations. They studied commanders’ logs, conducted interviews, and prepared analytical reports. After review, the materials were sent to headquarters, military academies, and defense enterprises, where they were transformed into concrete recommendations.
The system enabled not only the exchange of experience but its conversion into sustainable solutions. Mobilization and increased military spending helped restructure command and supply lines, strengthen logistics, and introduce new electronic warfare and targeting technologies. These measures stabilized the front and allowed Russia to withstand Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive.
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By now, Russia has turned this process into a permanent mechanism. In Moscow, more than twenty commissions work to implement lessons learned from the front. The army holds conferences, publishes bulletins and manuals, and brings together soldiers, engineers, and scientists. The Southern Military District regularly convenes representatives of different service branches and industries to jointly develop new methods for countering Ukrainian drones. At the 2023 conference of the Artillery Academy, fire tactics were revised to integrate drones into artillery command and control.
Over the past three years, Russia has made more than 450 temporary amendments to its combat manuals, and the command has already announced plans for a full revision of these documents after the war ends.
Industry and Technology
In the first year of the invasion, Ukraine held the advantage largely because Russian equipment was failing en masse. Inspections revealed defects in 30% of electronic warfare systems, and mechanical breakdowns accounted for up to 70% of all malfunctions. The causes were poor maintenance, outdated procedures, and low-quality components.
At first Moscow could not quickly remedy these problems. Industry operated by inertia, detached from the needs of the front. By 2023, however, the defence sector had received clear directives: improve quality, speed up repairs, and introduce innovations. The Ministry of Defence reduced bureaucratic barriers, accelerated R&D, and set up channels to gather feedback from the front lines.
Engineers were sent to occupied territories to observe equipment in combat. The Kremlin began integrating civilian universities and research centres into the military ecosystem: joint training grounds and test sites brought together military and civilian engineers.
The state also began to incentivise defence startups, helping them cooperate with large state-owned companies. Innovative firms now take part in military exhibitions and supply their own weapon prototypes. An elite unit called “Rubicon” has been created to specialise in the development and deployment of strike drones—its advances are then disseminated throughout the army.
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The result has been a marked technological reconfiguration. Russia has put serial production of modernised systems on stream, improved protection and targeting, increased the power of glide bombs, and expanded output of drones and modified Shaheds. Those changes have intensified Russian strikes and complicated the work of Ukraine’s air defences. Kyiv’s partners now have to boost deliveries of air- and electronic-defence systems, while Ukraine itself must develop longer-range rockets to strike targets on Russian soil.
Training, Discipline and the Limits of Adaptation
Combat experience has also altered the training system. Russia has introduced rotation between the front and training ranges, where veterans pass on lessons to recruits. When personal presence is impossible, secure video sessions are used. Instructors employ drones to observe exercises and analyse errors.
Training programmes have become more practical: modules on tactical medicine, navigation, drones and reconnaissance have been added. Junior officer training now includes independent operational planning rather than strict adherence to centralised orders—a rare step for a traditionally hierarchical Russian army.
Yet the system remains uneven. Courses for volunteers and conscripts are short, and regional centres often lag behind front-line requirements. Problems of discipline, coordination and professionalism persist. Violations are punished harshly, and incidents of violence within units are not uncommon. Psychological support is virtually absent, and the system for assessing soldiers’ condition is outdated.
Despite these weaknesses, the army continues to adapt. Russian command acknowledges that large armoured formations are no longer effective—the battlefield is now thoroughly observed by Ukrainian drones. The army is placing its emphasis on small assault teams, new drone units and reconnaissance detachments. This increases flexibility but leads to heavy losses, because small units are unable to hold ground.
Moscow is preparing for postwar reforms. After Afghanistan and Syria, the lessons of those conflicts were quickly lost, but this time is different: the Kremlin has both the resources and the administrative structure to conduct a large-scale reassessment. Discussions are already underway to revise operational concepts, military theory, regulations, and procurement plans through the mid-2030s. Particular attention is being paid to the vulnerability of armored vehicles and the integration of unmanned systems.
Russia After the War and Lessons for the West
In Moscow’s view, the future of warfare will be defined by autonomous technologies. Russian strategists see the key to success in combining drones, robots, and artificial intelligence. Concepts are being developed for swarms of autonomous aircraft, microdrones, and robotic systems for patrol and engineering tasks.
Artificial intelligence is seen as a tool to accelerate decision-making and increase the effectiveness of weapons. Moscow fears that without advanced AI systems, it will fall behind NATO countries. By the early 2030s, Russia aims to introduce AI-driven command and weapons algorithms. Yet investment remains limited, and the real impact of these technologies in the coming years is likely to be modest.
Even after the war, Russia will remain constrained by sanctions, personnel shortages, and costly procurement programs. But it now possesses something it lacked before—a systemic understanding of warfare and the capacity to learn.
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These same changes should trouble the West. Russia will emerge from the conflict with unique experience and its own vision of future warfare—one it is already sharing with China, Iran, and North Korea. The United States and Europe must draw lessons from the Ukrainian conflict no less seriously than Moscow does.
Despite the existence of NATO institutions dedicated to studying combat experience, their work remains fragmented. To avoid falling behind, the West must rethink its approaches to training, procurement, and operational planning. In the end, wars are what shape armies—and today’s war is shaping the Russian one, an army that, for all its flaws, has learned how to learn.