In 2024–2025, right-wing and right-wing populist parties won their largest representation in the European Parliament’s history. In Germany, the AfD became the country’s second-largest party. In Britain, Nigel Farage’s Reform UK overtook the traditional Conservatives in popularity. In France, Austria, Italy and the Netherlands, the right is either already in power or close to it.
189
seats held by the right in the European Parliament after the 2024 elections—a historic high
20.8%
won by the AfD in Germany’s 2025 Bundestag election—the second-best result nationwide
14.3%
won by Reform UK in Britain’s 2024 parliamentary election
9 of 27
EU countries governed by right-wing or center-right governments in 2025
Mainstream parties—Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and liberals—shared power in Western Europe for decades. Today that system is under strain. Voters once described as the “silent majority” are increasingly casting ballots for politicians who, until recently, were treated as fringe figures.
It is important to understand that “the right” in this context is not a monolithic bloc. The AfD in Germany, Reform UK in Britain, National Rally in France, Brothers of Italy, the FPÖ in Austria and Fidesz in Hungary each have their own history, electorate and priorities. But they share a common denominator: distrust of elites, skepticism about immigration and varying degrees of Euroskepticism.
Ratings: How Support Has Changed
Results in the latest national elections, %
Data: official electoral commissions. For readability: 100% = 50% of the vote. * Hungary, April 2026: Fidesz won 38.4% and moved into opposition after losing to Peter Magyar’s Tisza party (53.1%).
Where They Are Strong—and How Strong
Europe’s right-wing parties—status in 2025
In power
Strong opposition (20%+)
In coalition / supporting government
Notable growth (10–20%)
The map reflects the situation based on election data from 2022–2025. Cartographic data: Natural Earth / world-atlas.
Five Reasons the Right Is Winning
The rise of the right is not an accident, nor merely the result of foreign interference, though both factors are present. It is a response to real problems that mainstream parties either failed—or were unwilling—to address convincingly enough.
The Migration Crisis as a Catalyst
The years 2015–2016—the peak of Europe’s migration crisis—became a turning point for right-wing parties across the continent. The AfD entered the Bundestag that same year. But the issue was not only numbers: voters were troubled by the sense that governments had lost control of their borders, while real problems of integration were being suppressed. Germany admits hundreds of thousands of people each year, and most European countries have no systematic integration plan.
Economic Anxiety and the Cost of Living
The inflation of 2022–2023 hit the working class hardest. Energy bills doubled and tripled—above all in Germany, Britain and Eastern Europe. The right offered a simple narrative: the “green transition” had made energy expensive, elites were living at odds with the realities of ordinary people, and immigrants were competing with locals for jobs and housing. A simplification—but an electorally effective one.
A Crisis of Trust in Institutions
The 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine each damaged trust in governments and supranational institutions. For some voters, Euro-bureaucracy is seen as distant, unaccountable and ineffective. Brexit in Britain was precisely about this—and Reform UK inherits the same distrust of “London and Brussels.”
Social Media as the New Political Arena
Right-wing parties have proved far more effective in the digital sphere. The AfD and Reform UK generate huge reach on YouTube, TikTok and X. Nigel Farage is one of Britain’s most popular politicians on social media. Traditional parties that rely on old media are structurally disadvantaged in this space.
A Geographic and Cultural Divide
Eastern Germany votes for the AfD at far higher levels than the west. The “red wall” of Britain’s industrial towns first voted for Brexit and is now shifting toward Reform UK. This is not merely about economics: it is the sense that metropolitan elites look down on the values and way of life of “non-metropolitan” Europe. The right exploits this divide skillfully.
A Backlash Against the “Green Agenda”
The European Green Deal—an ambitious decarbonization program—has become a target for the right across Europe. Farmers in the Netherlands, Germany and Poland have staged mass protests against environmental restrictions. Wilders’s party in the Netherlands and the AfD openly promise to roll back climate policy. For some voters, the environmental agenda is seen as a threat to their established way of life.
Key Parties: Who They Are and Where They Came From
Despite the broader trend, each of Europe’s leading right-wing parties is a story of its own, with different roots, different electorates and different aims.
🇩🇪
Germany · since 2013
AfD—Alternative for Germany
2025 result20.8%
LeaderAlice Weidel
Position on the EUEuroskeptic
Intelligence servicesMonitored by the BfV
Founded as an anti-euro party of economists, it quickly evolved toward a hardline anti-immigration platform. It is especially strong in eastern Germany—the former GDR. Several regional branches have been classified by German intelligence as “confirmed right-wing extremist” organizations. The other parties in the Bundestag have agreed not to enter coalitions with the AfD.
🇬🇧
Britain · since 2018
Reform UK
2024 result14.3%
LeaderNigel Farage
Position on the EUHard Euroskepticism
Seats in Parliament5 (2024)
The heir to UKIP and the Brexit Party. Its 14.3% vote share produced only five seats because of Britain’s first-past-the-post system—a vivid illustration of how the electoral system limits representation. In polls, it regularly outpaces the Conservative Party. Farage is one of Europe’s most media-savvy politicians and is closely linked to Trump.
🇫🇷
France · since 1972
RN—National Rally
2024 result33.2%
LeaderMarine Le Pen
Position on the EUReform from within
Prime ministerBardella (RN), 2024
The former National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Marine Le Pen carried out the party’s “de-demonization”—removing antisemitic rhetoric and softening its position on the euro. In 2024, it won the prime minister’s office for the first time. Le Pen was convicted by a court in 2025, raising questions about her political future.
🇦🇹
Austria · since 1956
FPÖ—Freedom Party
2024 result29.2%
LeaderHerbert Kickl
Position on the EUEuroskeptic
In governmentYes, since 2025
One of Europe’s oldest right-wing parties. After winning the 2024 election, Kickl formed a government—the first time the FPÖ has led a coalition. It stands out among Europe’s right for its especially pronounced pro-Russian sympathies and opposition to support for Ukraine.
🇮🇹
Italy · since 2012
Brothers of Italy
2022 result26.0%
Leader / Prime ministerGiorgia Meloni
Position on the EUPragmatic skepticism
NATOSupports it
The most “systemic” example of the group: Meloni came to power in 2022 and has since gradually drifted toward the center. She supports Ukraine and NATO, setting her apart from the FPÖ and Fidesz. Critics point to the party’s post-fascist roots; supporters point to its pragmatism in power.
🇭🇺
Hungary · since 1988
Fidesz
April 2026 result38.4%—opposition
LeaderViktor Orbán
Position on the EUAgainst the “liberal” EU
In power2010–2026 (16 years)
On April 12, 2026, Orbán lost an election for the first time in 16 years. Péter Magyar’s Tisza party won a constitutional majority (53.1%). Fidesz was left with 38.4% and moved into opposition. Orbán’s defeat was one of the EU’s biggest political shocks in years.
Who Votes for the Right
The sociology of right-wing voting in Europe defies easy stereotypes. It is not only older white men from depressed regions—though they are part of it too.
The Electoral Profile of Europe’s Right-Wing Parties
Category
AfD (Germany)
Reform UK
RN (France)
Age
Younger than average; especially strong among young men under 30
Mostly 45+; but support among younger voters is growing
Broad reach; young people and the working class
Education
Higher among people without a university degree, but also growing among the educated
Stronger among people without a university degree
Stronger among people without higher education
Geography
Eastern Germany—the former GDR—at roughly twice the level seen in the west
Small towns and suburbs; former working-class areas in the north
Southern France, industrial areas and rural regions
Occupation
Workers, the self-employed and small-business owners
Workers and the lower middle class
The working class, farmers and small business
Main motive
Migration, the economy and distrust of the “system”
Immigration, the “two-party monopoly” and prices
Purchasing power, security and migration
The gender gap deserves particular attention: in Germany, far more men than women support the AfD. Among young men under 30, the AfD is the largest party. This is a pan-European trend: in most countries on the continent, young men are further to the right than young women—a divide that did not exist on this scale even a decade ago.
How the Right Came to Power: Key Moments
2015–2016
The Migration Crisis—The Turning Point
In 2015, more than a million people crossed the EU’s borders. Merkel’s “We can manage this” decision divided the country. The AfD entered the Bundestag in 2017 with 12.6%—the first time in postwar German history that a far-right party had won representation in the federal parliament.
2016
Brexit—Populism Defeats the Establishment
52% of Britons voted to leave the EU, against the recommendations of almost all major parties, businesses and international organizations. The effect of Brexit was felt across Europe: it showed that populist movements could win referendums.
2022
Giorgia Meloni Becomes Italy’s Prime Minister
Italy’s first female prime minister and the first leader with post-fascist roots. Brothers of Italy won 26%. Fears of a rupture with NATO and the EU did not materialize—Meloni took a more moderate position than her critics had expected.
2023
Geert Wilders Wins in the Netherlands
The PVV Freedom Party won 23.9%—first place in the election. Wilders, known for anti-Islam rhetoric and long kept under permanent protection because of death threats, became a central figure in the formation of the government.
2024
Historic European Parliament Elections
The right-wing ECR and ID groups won record combined representation. In France, Le Pen outperformed Macron by a two-to-one margin, forcing the president to call snap parliamentary elections. In Austria, the FPÖ won federal elections for the first time in its history.
2025
The AfD Becomes Germany’s Second-Largest Party
In snap Bundestag elections, the AfD won 20.8%—the second-best result after the CDU/CSU. Alice Weidel put herself forward as a candidate for chancellor. The other parties reaffirmed the “firewall”—their refusal to enter a coalition with the AfD. The CDU formed a government with the SPD.
What This Means for Europe
The Mainstream Is Adapting—and Moving Right
The most direct effect of the right’s rise is not the right itself in power, but the fact that traditional parties are copying its rhetoric. Tough migration policy, skepticism toward climate spending and anti-elite notes are all seeping into the platforms of conservatives and Social Democrats. The “firewall” against the right increasingly looks like rhetoric rather than a real boundary.
The Ukraine Crisis Has Divided the Right
The war in Ukraine has created a fault line within Europe’s right. Meloni supports Ukraine and NATO. The FPÖ sympathizes with Moscow. The AfD takes an ambivalent position. Under Orbán, Fidesz was the main pro-Russian voice in the EU—after his defeat in April 2026, that role within the right-wing bloc became vacant. This matters: the “right” is not a monolith in geopolitical terms.
The Hungarian Precedent Cuts Both Ways
Orbán’s 16 years in power showed that a populist party, given enough power, can rewrite the rules of the game in its own favor—the courts, the media and the electoral system. But April 2026 showed the reverse as well: even such a system can lose when mobilization is strong enough. Péter Magyar’s Tisza won with 53% and a constitutional majority. Both lessons matter for understanding where the right’s electoral success ends and the dismantling of democracy begins.
Demography Works Against the Right—in the Long Run
Young women, university graduates and residents of big cities vote for the right at significantly lower rates. As the share of educated urban voters in the electorate grows, the right’s structural base may narrow. But that is “in the long run”—elections are happening now, and today’s young man voting for the AfD will not necessarily change his position in 20 years.
The rise of the right in Europe is not a temporary anomaly that will disappear on its own. It is a response to real problems: uncontrolled migration, the rising cost of living and a sense of cultural and economic displacement among part of the population. Until mainstream parties offer convincing answers to these problems—not just rhetoric about “values” and “democracy”—the right will continue to gain strength. The question is not whether this trend will continue. The question is whether it will stop at the level of influential opposition or go further.