The Truce Has Only Deepened Internal Divisions

The fragile ceasefire in Gaza lasted barely a week, but when the Knesset opened its winter session on October 20, it quickly reverted to its usual internal feuds. Justice Minister Yariv Levin of the ruling Likud party announced plans to revive a bill curbing the powers of the Supreme Court and the attorney general. The speaker of parliament refused to address the chief justice by title, prompting opposition leader Yair Lapid to call him “the speaker of only half the Knesset.” President Isaac Herzog departed from his prepared remarks to reprimand lawmakers for their “crude discourtesy, lack of respect for human dignity, and contempt for state institutions.”

With the war’s end—albeit a temporary one—attention has shifted back to domestic politics. Parliamentary elections must be held by the end of October 2026. Support for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hovers at under one-third of the population. His bloc of far-right and ultra-Orthodox parties is unlikely to secure a majority, according to forecasts. Yet the opposition—ranging from secular nationalists to Islamic conservatives and Arab communists—is equally unlikely to unite behind a single candidate or form a stable coalition. That leaves the political landscape wide open.

Israeli politics was deeply divided even before the war. From 2019 to 2022, the country held five consecutive elections, with voters split almost evenly over whether Benjamin Netanyahu should return to power. At the time, the opposition fought him over plans to curb the powers of the Supreme Court and over corruption charges—which he denies. Since then, Israel has endured Hamas’s surprise attack on October 7, 2023, and the longest war in its history. More than half a million Israelis have served in the military over the past two years, most of them reservists forced to leave their families and jobs for extended periods. The entire country has come under fire from Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

These events have weakened Netanyahu’s standing. Many blame his government for failing to prevent the attack and for prolonging the war. “There is a strong sense that the basic social contract—under which the state is obliged to ensure security—has been grossly violated,” says political analyst and sociologist Dahlia Scheindlin. “It’s hard to predict how that sense of betrayal will play out in the elections.”

The war has deepened public resentment toward the ultra-Orthodox community, which makes up about 14% of Israel’s population and refuses military service on religious grounds. The Supreme Court ruled their exemption unconstitutional, but the government ignored the decision for fear of collapsing the coalition. Meanwhile, members of the community continue to receive increasing state funding. Growing discontent among Netanyahu’s allies could pave the way for new political alliances.

Тем более что война изменила политическую самоидентификацию израильтян. По данным долгосрочного исследования центра Agam Labs, 65% населения сегодня относят себя к правым (против 56% три года назад), лишь 13% — к левым. При этом 79% выступают за прекращение войны в Газе. На вопрос, что важнее — «нормализация» отношений с Саудовской Аравией и другими арабскими странами или аннексия Западного берега, лишь 32% выбрали аннексию. И хотя все больше граждан считают религию ключевой частью своей идентичности, лишь чуть более четверти хотели бы, чтобы страна управлялась по религиозным законам.

Это противоречие, отмечает политолог Ейиль Талшир из Еврейского университета, входящая в исследовательскую группу: «Грядущие выборы станут референдумом о том, как израильтяне видят свою страну и кем себя считают».