Who Supports Whom in the Iran–US–Israel War

For four decades, Iran and Israel waged their confrontation through intermediaries. Tehran financed and armed Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; Israel struck Iranian assets in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. The violence was real, but contained—the sides preserved plausible deniability and avoided a direct clash that could escalate into an existential conflict.

That phase ended decisively on June 13, 2025, when Israel launched the Twelve-Day War—a large-scale surprise campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear sites, missile factories, senior military commanders, and nuclear scientists. Iran responded by launching more than 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 kamikaze drones, striking civilian infrastructure and military targets across Israel. The United States intercepted Iranian attacks and struck three underground nuclear facilities using bunker-buster bombs. The ceasefire held—for eight months.

Iran’s strategic architecture—what Chatham House describes as “forward defense”—was built on the premise that armed proxies would intercept threats before they reached the country’s own territory. Through Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Syria, Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen, Iran constructed a network of destabilization that enabled it to project influence while avoiding direct military confrontation with Israel and the United States.

Since October 2023, that network has been systematically degraded by Israeli military operations: Hamas has been reduced to a struggle for institutional survival, Hezbollah has lost a significant share of its arsenal and leadership, the Syrian corridor has been severed following the fall of the Assad regime, and Iraqi militias have become fragmented. The Houthis in Yemen remain the most intact component—largely due to their geographic distance from Israeli strikes and the combat experience gained during years of war with Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, Iran demonstrated that even a weakened axis remains capable of delivering devastating retaliation. On February 28, Iranian forces launched hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones at Israel, US bases across the Persian Gulf, and civilian infrastructure throughout the region—including strikes on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Turkey, and Cyprus. The initial barrage triggered a wave of follow-on attacks—hundreds of missiles and thousands of drones deployed by Iran across the region—leaving more than 2,000 people dead in Iran, Lebanon, and Israel, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee their homes in Lebanon, and stranding hundreds of thousands of passengers across the Middle East.

The joint US–Israel military operation has no modern precedent in its level of coordination. The United States and Israel may assign different names to their campaigns—Epic Fury and Rising Lion—but in practice they are inseparable. The fusion of intelligence, coordinated air operations, joint cyberattacks, and synchronized information campaigns has blurred the line between the two militaries.

Critics in Washington point to what political scientist Glenn Snyder termed “alliance entrapment.” Israel was going to strike. The United States could either join or absorb the retaliation—this is precisely how Snyder’s mechanism operates in real time, as acknowledged not only by critics but by members of the administration itself. Secretary of State Rubio effectively confirmed that Washington had no real choice but to participate once Israel had decided to proceed with the strike.

Washington’s stated strategic objectives include degrading Iran’s nuclear program, its ballistic missile arsenal, naval capabilities, and its mechanisms of control over proxy forces. The official position also encompasses drones and the management of “terrorist proxies,” and the United States has already made substantial progress toward these goals. However, analysts at the Atlantic Council warn that Iran views the situation as an existential conflict and assumes that a prolonged war of attrition will, over time, erode the resolve of the United States and the Gulf states.

Neither Russia nor China has entered the war. Both publicly call for restraint. Yet their contribution to the development of Iran’s military capabilities over the past decade has directly shaped Tehran’s ability to wage war. Russia supplied Iran with long-range S-300 air defense systems (destroyed by Israel in April and October), began transferring Su-35 fighter jets, conducts Iranian satellite launches, and is likely sharing advanced military technologies with Tehran, including nuclear-related ones.

China’s role is more economic and technological in nature. The 2021 “comprehensive strategic partnership” spans the military sphere, security, intelligence, and cyber cooperation. Chinese-designed C-802 anti-ship missiles, produced in Iran, were used by Hezbollah in 2006 and by the Houthis in 2016 against Israeli, American, and Emirati vessels. North Korea, for its part, has for decades remained a steady supplier of ballistic missile technologies and underground infrastructure to Iran.

The defining asymmetry of this conflict is strategic patience. The United States and Israel can inflict large-scale military damage, but Iran’s leadership assumes that a prolonged war of attrition—eroding US political will, placing pressure on Gulf economies, and driving up oil prices—may ultimately yield results. From Tehran’s perspective, any cessation of hostilities would amount only to a temporary pause until the United States or Israel rebuild their military capacity and resume the conflict.

The nuclear question remains unresolved. Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium—estimated at hundreds of kilograms of 60% enriched uranium prior to the strikes—may not have been fully destroyed. Whether Iran can reconstitute a weapons program, and whether new leadership (Khamenei’s son is reportedly being groomed as successor) will choose that path, will define the next phase of the war.

It is already clear that the Middle East’s alliance architecture has been irreversibly reshaped. However the war ends—through regime change or negotiation—Iran is likely to emerge weakened and far less capable of sustaining its previous level of regional influence. The question is no longer whether the “Axis of Resistance” will endure, but what will replace it.