After a quarter century of attempts to build a strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi, the relationship now stands on the brink of rupture. Donald Trump’s return has brought not the promised breakthrough but tariffs, pressure, and public reproaches directed at India for purchasing Russian oil. The consequences were swift: a sharp decline in the number of Indian students at American universities, businesses turning to Europe, and closer ties with Moscow. The symbolism was unmistakable when Narendra Modi traveled to China yesterday to meet Xi Jinping for the first time in seven years. For India, it was a gesture underscoring a course toward greater self-reliance and a deliberate cooling of relations with the United States.
Until recently, India seemed captivated by America and its newly re-elected president. A source of national pride was that Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the first foreign leader Donald Trump received in the Oval Office after his inauguration. Unlike Europe and other regions, opinion polls showed that most Indians trusted Trump to “do the right thing.”
India was full of young people aspiring to study at American universities and secure a better future for themselves and their families. Business elites were on the verge of expanding exports to the world’s largest consumer market and strengthening their industrial base to compete with China, counting on a promised fast-track trade deal. Diplomats and military officials assumed that a shared hostility toward China would push the United States and India into a new strategic partnership.
After twenty-five years of steady, bipartisan efforts to deepen ties with India, Trump’s return looked like a dawn for all involved. What could possibly go wrong? As it turned out, quite a lot.
Despite optimism about a quick trade agreement and stronger bilateral ties, things began to unravel soon after Modi’s return from Washington. By late February, Indians watched as their compatriots were deported from the United States. A month later, Trump announced “Liberation Day” tariffs, slapping a 26 percent duty on Indian imports into the U.S.
The most serious blow came in May, when India retaliated against Pakistan for a terrorist attack that killed 26 tourists in Indian Kashmir. The escalation was rapid: by the third day, Indian forces were already targeting a military base near a division overseeing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
It was not the first major clash—over the past 75 years the two countries have fought four wars. But both now possess significant nuclear capabilities, making any confrontation far more perilous.
At first, Washington showed little interest: Vice President J.D. Vance said on Fox News, “We are not going to intervene in a war that is fundamentally none of our business.” But as the fighting intensified, both Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio held calls with the two capitals, after which a ceasefire was quickly agreed.
Trump immediately claimed credit for halting the clashes, saying he had used trade leverage to pressure both sides. “We stopped a nuclear conflict,” the American leader declared. “I think it could have been a devastating nuclear war, millions of people might have died, so I am very proud of that.” Pakistan promptly acknowledged the White House’s role, while India insisted the deal had been reached bilaterally.
As U.S.-India trade talks continued to stall over agriculture and other contentious issues, Trump and Modi spoke by phone in June. I was told that during this conversation the American president pressed Modi to publicly credit him for ending the May fighting, and invited the Indian prime minister to the White House on the same dates when Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, was expected to visit.
Modi had no intention of entertaining either request. India has consistently maintained that its conflict with Pakistan is strictly bilateral—an approach anchored in past agreements between the two countries that reject external mediation. And as head of government, Modi simply could not accept meeting a Pakistani military commander as an equal.
That call turned out to be the last between the two leaders. After Modi’s refusal, Washington’s stance in trade talks hardened noticeably, reducing the prospects for a deal. Trump, however, has continued to insist that the final agreement must be struck personally between him and Modi. The Indian leader, though, understands what the U.S. president truly seeks—his public acknowledgment of the claim that it was Trump who prevented a nuclear confrontation.
This context partly explains why Trump soon chose India for a public rebuke over its purchases of Russian oil. In early August, amid growing frustration with Russia over the war in Ukraine, he labeled India a “dead economy” and imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on the country for importing Russian oil. Many nations buy Russian oil and other energy resources—including the United States, which imports enriched uranium from Russia for its nuclear plants—but only India was singled out.
The decision appeared paradoxical: for years Washington had encouraged India to purchase Russian oil provided the price remained below the $60-a-barrel cap set by the West. Without those supplies, oil prices would have soared, fueling inflation. Meanwhile, China remains the largest buyer of Russian oil and gas, yet it faced neither tariffs nor sanctions.
After a quarter century of building a strategic partnership with the world’s most populous country—its second-largest democracy and soon-to-be third-largest economy—why was India singled out? As commentators around the world quickly noted, the move makes no sense economically, politically, or strategically. But the damage is already done. The number of Indian students in U.S. universities has dropped by 40–50% from last year’s record of 300 000. Businesses are shifting to other markets, aided by new trade agreements with Britain and, soon, the EU. Indian officials are strengthening ties with Moscow, and Narendra Modi has traveled to China for the first time in seven years.
Those in India who long warned about the risks of excessive entanglement now feel vindicated, while Modi himself increasingly emphasizes the critical importance of self-reliance. The United States, meanwhile, is losing a strategic partner in one of the world’s most pivotal regions.