Europe Will Have to Guarantee Ukraine’s Security Itself

Just weeks have passed since the meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Alaska, yet two realities have already emerged. First, persuading Russia to end the war has proved far harder than the US president anticipated. Days after the summit, Moscow launched one of its largest barrages against Kyiv—nearly 600 drones and several dozen missiles. On September 7, an even more massive strike followed, this time targeting one of the capital’s key government buildings. Second, it has become clear that the security guarantees Kyiv insists on as an integral part of any peace deal are more essential than ever. Ukraine’s security ultimately depends on a capable army, but it is equally vital that the US and European countries reaffirm their commitment to support Kyiv, while making it unmistakably clear to Moscow that renewed aggression would mean war with NATO.

The most reliable form of such guarantees would be NATO membership, but Trump has ruled that out. His administration has also signaled that Europe, not the US, should bear the main responsibility for providing these commitments, and it has refrained from pledging direct involvement. That left European leaders scrambling for a workable formula. The first step came in September with Emmanuel Macron’s statement that 26 Western allies were prepared to support Ukraine "from land, sea, or air" once the fighting stops. But specifics remain scarce: so far, only Britain, Estonia, France, and Lithuania have publicly pledged to station their units on Ukrainian soil.

Europe now faces the challenge of turning political resolve into concrete action. That will require strengthening Ukraine’s armed forces and using NATO resources to back them—even if full alliance membership for Kyiv remains out of reach.

In practice, European countries will have to acknowledge that when it comes to tangible guarantees, they will be on their own. US contributions, at best, will remain limited. That is why the best way to convince Kyiv of the seriousness of these commitments is to continue systematically strengthening Ukraine’s military and to deploy substantial NATO contingents in and around the country. The task is difficult, but without it there can be no credible strategy for ending the war or securing Ukraine’s safety. And a strong, free, and independent Ukraine is a cornerstone of Europe’s own security.

To build lasting and effective security guarantees for Ukraine, European leaders will need to focus on three interconnected components. First, they must recognize the importance of Ukraine’s own armed forces and the extraordinary resolve of its citizens to defend the country’s sovereignty and independence. These factors form the foundation of Kyiv’s ability to protect itself, and sustaining them requires Europe’s ongoing support. The second element is the readiness of European states to deploy significant land, air, and naval forces in and around Ukraine to back the Ukrainian army in the event of renewed aggression. Such a decision would send Moscow an unambiguous message: Ukraine’s security is Europe’s first line of defense. Finally, a true guarantee can only be achieved when Ukraine is integrated into European structures—beginning with the European Union and, ultimately, NATO.

Any settlement with Russia to end the war must rest on all three pillars. This means that peace cannot involve restrictions on Ukraine’s armed forces or on its sovereignty. The decision to station European contingents on Ukrainian territory must be made by Kyiv and its allies, not by Moscow. The Kremlin will, of course, categorically oppose such principles—for stripping Ukraine of these guarantees was one of the war’s central aims. For this reason, an end to the fighting is not yet in sight. However, as human and economic costs mount, the parties may move toward a ceasefire or even a formal truce. Yet even in that case, each of the three components must remain intact.

Ukraine’s own armed forces—nearly one million soldiers with unique combat experience—remain the ultimate guarantee of its security. For Europe, the challenge is to turn Ukraine into a "steel hedgehog," as EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas put it: a country capable of delivering a devastating response to any new aggression. To achieve that, it needs modern weapons—air defense systems, fighter jets, long-range missiles. While the Trump administration has made clear it no longer intends to fund Ukraine’s defense, he endorsed the idea of European countries purchasing American arms for Kyiv. The first deliveries are already underway: Germany and Norway have acquired additional Patriot systems, while Denmark and the Netherlands have ordered nearly a thousand air-to-ground guided missiles.

Equally important is ensuring steady financial support for Ukraine’s defense sector. The country has deep traditions in this field: for decades, it played a central role in the Soviet military-industrial complex. After 1991, that potential declined, but Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 reactivated production capacities. In 2024, defense output reached nearly $10 billion, with $15 billion expected in 2025. According to Oleksandr Kamyshin, former minister of strategic industries and now head of the defense sector, Ukraine could produce $35 billion worth of arms annually but is constrained by a lack of funding. Financing must therefore become a priority for Europe’s partners.

After three and a half years of war, Ukraine’s defense industry is operating with far greater agility and efficiency than those of Europe or the United States. US production of artillery shells still falls short of one million annually, while Ukrainian plants manufactured 2.5 million in 2024 alone, with output expected to rise further. That same year, Ukraine assembled two million FPV drones and aims to scale production to five million this year. In addition, it has set targets to build around 30,000 long-range drones, 3,000 cruise missiles, and hundreds of new ballistic missiles in the coming months. European partners play a crucial role in this effort. Joint ventures with European firms provide access to technology, while funding from individual governments and EU institutions helps expand production volumes. By embedding Ukraine’s growing defense sector within an expanding European defense industry, allies are laying the foundation for Ukraine’s long-term security.

To establish lasting and effective security guarantees for Ukraine, European leaders will need to focus on three interconnected components. First, they must recognize the importance of Ukraine’s own armed forces and the extraordinary determination of its citizens to defend the country’s sovereignty and independence. These factors form the foundation of Kyiv’s ability to protect itself, and sustaining them requires Europe’s continued support. The second element is the readiness of European states to deploy substantial land, air, and naval forces in and around Ukraine to support the Ukrainian army in the event of renewed aggression. Such a decision would send Moscow an unmistakable signal: Ukraine’s security is Europe’s first line of defense. Finally, genuine guarantees can only be achieved when Ukraine is integrated into European structures—beginning with the European Union and, ultimately, NATO.

Any agreement with Russia to end the war must rest on all three pillars. This means that a settlement cannot include restrictions on Ukraine’s armed forces or its sovereignty. The decision to deploy European contingents on Ukrainian territory must be made by Kyiv and its allies—not by Moscow. The Kremlin will, of course, categorically reject such principles, for stripping Ukraine of these guarantees was one of the war’s central objectives. For this reason, an end to the fighting is not yet in sight. However, as human and economic costs rise, the parties may eventually move toward a ceasefire or even a formal truce. Yet even in that case, each of the three components must remain intact.

Ukraine’s own armed forces—nearly one million soldiers with unique combat experience—are the ultimate guarantee of its security. For Europe, the challenge is to turn Ukraine into a "steel hedgehog," as EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas put it: a country capable of delivering a crushing response to any new aggression. To achieve that, Kyiv requires modern weaponry—air defense systems, fighter aircraft, long-range missiles. While the Trump administration has made clear it no longer intends to fund Ukraine’s defense, he endorsed the idea of European countries purchasing American weapons on Kyiv’s behalf. The first shipments are already being assembled: Germany and Norway have acquired additional Patriot systems, while Denmark and the Netherlands have ordered nearly a thousand air-to-ground guided missiles.

Equally crucial is ensuring consistent financial support for Ukraine’s defense industry. The country has deep traditions in this field: for decades, it played a key role in building the Soviet military-industrial complex. After 1991, that potential declined, but Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 reignited production capacity. In 2024, defense output reached nearly $10 billion, with $15 billion expected in 2025. According to Oleksandr Kamyshin, former minister of strategic industries and now head of the defense sector, Ukraine could produce up to $35 billion worth of arms annually but is constrained by insufficient funding. Financing must therefore become a priority for Europe’s partners.

After three and a half years of war, Ukraine’s defense industry is operating far more flexibly and efficiently than those of Europe or the United States. US production of artillery shells still falls short of one million per year, while Ukrainian plants manufactured 2.5 million in 2024 alone, with output expected to grow further. That same year, Ukraine assembled two million FPV drones and aims to raise production to five million this year. In addition, targets have been set to produce about 30,000 long-range drones, 3,000 cruise missiles, and hundreds of new ballistic missiles in the coming months. European partners play a crucial role in this effort. Joint ventures with European companies provide access to technology, while funding from individual governments and EU institutions helps scale production. By embedding Ukraine’s growing defense industry into Europe’s expanding defense sector, allies are laying the foundation for Ukraine’s long-term security.

Beyond strengthening Ukraine’s own military capabilities, European allies must be prepared to commit forces to ensure its long-term security. Today, Ukraine’s armed forces are the largest and most battle-hardened in Europe. Their strength means that deterring Russia from resuming the war—and, if necessary, helping repel an attack—will not require a massive European ground presence at the front. Ukraine can meet most of its needs on its own. Still, to make security guarantees credible, Europe must assume substantial commitments and be ready to back Kyiv with its own forces.

That credibility depends directly on actual deployments. At a minimum, European countries should send four combat brigades to Ukraine—around 20,000 troops, including mechanized and infantry units. These should be equipped with mobile air defense systems, long-range strike capabilities, and highly mobile forces capable of countering the Russian army. In addition, European air forces should assign at least ten squadrons—around 200 combat aircraft—to control the skies and protect ground operations. In the Black Sea, Europe will need to maintain a substantial naval presence to safeguard Ukraine’s coastline and maritime routes.

Such a "guarantee force" would represent a major step for European countries. So far, France and the United Kingdom have taken the lead by pledging to send troops, joined by several Baltic states. But Poland and Germany remain cautious, citing the need to focus on their current defense obligations. For Germany, this means permanently stationing a combat brigade in Lithuania. These arguments are understandable but short-sighted. If Ukraine’s security is truly existential for Europe—as its leaders insist—then participation in Ukraine’s defense would be the most significant contribution Berlin, Warsaw, Vilnius, and other capitals could make to safeguarding the continent. Deploying troops in Ukraine strengthens national and regional security far more than keeping them at home.

From the outset of the debate in February, European leaders have stressed the importance of US backing for such operations and the need for an American "insurance policy." Washington has capabilities Europe lacks, above all in intelligence and surveillance, without which Ukraine’s defense cannot be fully effective. Moreover, if the war were to spill into a neighboring NATO country, US and allied involvement would become inevitable anyway.

That is why any European deployment in Ukraine should take place under a NATO framework. Such a mission could be planned, authorized, and directed by the alliance, even though Ukraine is not a member. Not every NATO state would need to participate. In recent decades, the alliance has conducted numerous operations beyond the scope of Article 5, including in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Libya, and Iraq. In Libya, NATO launched an air and naval operation to protect civilians and enforce the arms embargo: only half of its members contributed forces, but non-NATO states such as Jordan and Sweden also joined. The United States limited its role to functions only it could perform—air-to-air refueling and intelligence. A mission to secure Ukraine could operate in much the same way, pooling NATO and non-NATO resources.

Washington may choose not to participate fully, limiting its role to specific capabilities such as intelligence or air defense support. But placing the mission under NATO’s umbrella would provide transparency for all 32 allies and strengthen deterrence: Moscow would clearly understand that if the war spilled into NATO territory, the alliance could invoke Article 5 and come to the defense of the attacked state.

Ultimately, the strongest guarantee of Ukraine’s security will be its full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, placing it on the same footing as countries such as Germany, Poland, and Spain. Kyiv is on an accelerated path toward EU membership, but completing the process will require further sweeping reforms. As for NATO, allies declared back in 2008 that "Ukraine will become a member," and last year reaffirmed that the country is on an "irreversible path" to joining the alliance. Although accession has been blocked by the hesitation of some states, including the United States, a free and independent Ukraine must have a place in NATO.

Of course, membership cannot be finalized while the war continues, but the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement need not be an obstacle. In 1955, West Germany entered NATO while still formally claiming East German territory. At that time, allies made clear that their commitments applied only to West Germany. By analogy, Ukraine’s membership could apply only to areas under Kyiv’s control, without automatically drawing NATO into military operations to reclaim occupied territories.

For Moscow, the war against Ukraine is not only an attempt to subjugate a neighbor. The Kremlin sees it as the first step toward dismantling the postwar order, which brought security and prosperity to hundreds of millions of Europeans who had long lived under Soviet rule. Ukraine has thus become the frontline of a much broader and existential confrontation. Peace and stability across Europe—and ultimately the United States—are impossible without a strong, sovereign, and independent Ukraine. The question now is whether Europe has the wisdom and resolve to ensure that outcome.