The Baltic Shadow

The drones spotted on the evening of September 25 over the German state of Schleswig-Holstein did not move randomly but along strictly parallel lines, as if scanning the area—beneath them lay critical infrastructure sites: a power plant, an oil refinery, a hospital, a government building and the Thyssenkrupp arms factory. Similar aircraft were soon observed over an army base in Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania and the port of Rostock. Days earlier, drones had been detected above the airports of Copenhagen and Oslo, as well as over Danish oil platforms and military installations in Denmark and Sweden. “There is no doubt that everything points to a professional actor,” said Danish Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen, describing the incidents as “a hybrid attack.”

Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its intelligence services have waged a campaign of sabotage and subversive operations across Europe—known as “hybrid warfare” or “grey-zone tactics,” a liminal state between peace and open conflict. It encompasses cyberattacks, airspace incursions, and acts of infrastructure sabotage. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the number of confirmed sabotage incidents tripled between 2023 and 2024. Norwegian intelligence reported the hacking of a dam, while Lithuanian authorities charged 15 Russian intelligence operatives accused of using explosive parcels to target cargo planes in Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom.

China employs similar tactics. The number of Chinese military sorties into Taiwan’s air defence zone has risen from a few dozen in 2019 to more than 3,000 last year, while in the Baltic Sea, Chinese vessels have damaged underwater cables and gas pipelines. The blurring of lines between Russian and Chinese “grey-zone” operations only deepens the sense of uncertainty.

“This creates a defender’s dilemma: respond forcefully and risk appearing aggressive, or stay silent and erode credibility,” explains Elisabeth Braw of the Atlantic Council. The West recognises that Moscow and Beijing are testing its resolve but lacks a unified response. That is precisely the aim—to sow doubt about America’s willingness to defend its allies. How the West responds to these provocations will determine not only the security of Europe and Asia but also the durability of U.S. alliances.

On September 10, Russian decoy drones were shot down over Poland; on September 19, three MiG-31s spent twelve minutes in Estonian airspace, and Norway reported three border violations. The number of such incidents has doubled. Their motives remain unclear: some experts cite negligence, but Estonia and Germany see a coordinated operation. “Nothing in Russia happens by accident,” said Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur. “Russia is testing our resolve and trying to sow instability,” added German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul.

Some interpret Moscow’s renewed activity as a response to Washington’s shifting stance. Donald Trump has effectively distanced himself from the war, declaring that the United States will sell weapons to Kyiv but not supply them for free. In the draft of the new defence strategy, Europe’s priority has been downgraded. “Putin has now begun to intrude into NATO borders,” said U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, but clarified: “America will not intervene with troops.” When asked whether Russian aircraft should be shot down, Trump replied, “Yes,” but added, “It depends on the circumstances.”

This ambiguity has divided Europe. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski warned, “If another missile or aircraft crosses our border—and it is shot down—don’t come to complain afterwards.” Germany, meanwhile, cautions against the risk of an “escalation trap.”

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has urged allies to exercise caution. Swedish General Jonas Wikman, whose fighter jets took part in intercepting the Russian aircraft, noted that he can decide independently whether to use weapons, “but it depends on the level of threat.” NATO monitored the MiGs’ movements throughout the incident, and they posed no danger to ground targets.

Each NATO member state has the right to shoot down intruders without prior approval from the alliance’s command. The Baltic states have no fighter jets of their own—airspace is patrolled by allies—but Poland is capable of downing any hostile aircraft. The issue is not military but political: if Russia retaliates, will Trump intervene? And can Europeans act in unison if one ally opens fire?

The growing risk of miscalculation adds to the anxiety. The wear and tear of equipment and the declining training standards of Russian pilots increase the likelihood of accidental conflict. In 2022, a Russian pilot mistakenly fired two missiles at a British aircraft over the Black Sea—only luck prevented a catastrophe. “The more aircraft there are in the sky, the higher the risk of mistakes,” says Wikman.

Europe’s allies are strengthening their defences. Five days after the Estonian airspace incident, Polish paratroopers landed on the Swedish island of Gotland—a strategic stronghold in the Baltic Sea. Sweden moved air defence systems to the island and raised the readiness of its air force. The United Kingdom, France, Germany and Sweden sent anti-drone equipment to Copenhagen, while the EU accelerated the launch of Eastern Flank Watch—a “drone wall” project along its eastern border.

But that, according to former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, is precisely what Moscow wants: to force NATO to focus on its own defence and scale back support for Kyiv. “The more Europeans feel threatened themselves, the fewer resources go to Ukraine,” he says.

Russia is also resorting to “grey-zone” tactics because it has failed to achieve success on the battlefield. “They are looking for new ways to pressure Europe,” notes Romanian Defence Minister Liviu-Ionuț Moșteanu. Estonian minister Hanno Pevkur adds: “Since they are not succeeding at the front, they are trying to say: deal with your own problems and stop sending air defence systems to Ukraine.”

Many provocations target countries that actively support Kyiv. Denmark is preparing to host production of Ukrainian weapons, and Poland serves as a key logistics hub for arms deliveries. “By sending drones into NATO airspace and hiding behind plausible deniability, Putin is signalling that participation in aiding Ukraine comes at a cost,” explains Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre.

The main objective is to influence public opinion rather than policymakers. By spreading anxiety and distrust, Moscow undermines citizens’ confidence and weakens support for Ukraine. This mirrors a strategy similar to China’s: the encirclement of Taiwan with military manoeuvres is designed to demoralise its population and instil a sense of inevitability. The difference is that China acts with a sense of time, while Russia acts from a sense of loss and the need to take risks.

Experts argue that it is more effective not to respond to every provocation but to focus on what adversaries are trying to prevent: continued support for Ukraine and Taiwan. “We must act smarter and not get fixated on provocations,” says Pevkur. “A military response is possible, but strategically we need to increase the pressure—through sanctions, oil price caps and military support.”

Whether the West will remain united is still uncertain. Yet the series of incidents has forced many to acknowledge the reality of the threat. “We are not at war, but we are no longer at peace,” said German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, listing the daily acts of sabotage, cyberattacks and espionage across Europe.