After Yet Another Failed Call With Putin, Trump Again Called the War in Ukraine "Biden’s War"

Chronologically, Trump’s claim sounds effective—the war began under Biden, not under him. But what matters more than a change in leadership is what Washington did as the threat escalated. Starting in the fall of 2021, U.S. intelligence detected Russian troop movements consistent with preparations for an invasion. During this time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly urged the United States to impose sanctions on Russia before an invasion, hoping to strengthen deterrence.

The Biden administration rejected this approach. In early February 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris stated that sanctions would only be imposed if Russia attacked. According to her, sanctions were meant as a threat—not to be deployed preemptively. This position held until February 24.

After the war began, the United States became Ukraine’s primary provider of military and economic assistance. In the first two and a half years of the war, Washington approved aid packages worth tens of billions of dollars. The deliveries included air defense systems, artillery, armored vehicles, and ammunition.

Trump’s rhetoric targets not only Biden personally, but the broader foreign policy orientation of the Democratic Party. In his speeches, he argues that this approach—NATO expansion, the promotion of democratic values abroad, and a refusal to engage with authoritarian regimes—contributed to the escalation. The phrase "Biden’s war" serves as shorthand for a wider strategy that Trump contrasts with his own: emphasis on personal diplomacy, reduced international entanglements, and a rejection of ideological agendas.

In this context, Trump supporters point out that major milestones in the Ukraine conflict occurred under Democratic administrations: the annexation of Crimea and the start of the Donbas war in 2014 under Barack Obama, and the full-scale invasion in 2022 under Joe Biden. From their perspective, this suggests that the Democrats’ foreign policy has failed to deter the Kremlin. By contrast, during the Republican administration of 2017–2021, Russia refrained from launching large-scale offensives beyond the existing front lines. Although control over Crimea and parts of the Donbas was maintained, no attempts were made to reclaim these territories by force.

In January 2021, Russia began a gradual buildup of troops near Ukraine’s borders. This was accompanied by a series of statements and demands delivered through diplomatic channels. Among them: a legally binding commitment not to expand NATO further, the withdrawal of NATO military infrastructure from Eastern Europe, and guarantees of Ukraine’s neutrality. The United States and its allies insisted that such demands violated core principles of European security and the right of sovereign states to choose their own foreign policy orientation.

The very phrase "Biden’s war" implies that responsibility lies not only with the current president, but with the broader approach that has defined Democratic foreign policy for decades. This includes NATO expansion, support for pro-Western states, and a refusal to accept compromises that would limit third countries’ freedom to choose their alliances.

Trump supporters argue that this strategy left Russia with no alternative but war. From this perspective, the conflict was a foreseeable outcome of policies pursued by Democrats over the past two decades. Two main points are cited in support of this view: first, the most acute phases of the Ukraine conflict—2014 and 2022—occurred under Democratic administrations; second, Russia had repeatedly demanded changes to Europe’s security architecture, which were ultimately rejected.

However, a direct causal link between U.S. policy and the Kremlin’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion is far from conclusive. NATO’s expansion occurred at the initiative and with the consent of Eastern European countries—not unilaterally. Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO long predated Biden’s presidency and remained unresolved. Between 2014 and 2022, talks between Moscow and the West continued, but no proposals emerged that satisfied both sides. Russia demanded legally binding guarantees and Ukraine’s neutrality, while the U.S. maintained that neither Washington nor Moscow had the right to dictate the foreign policy of a sovereign state.

From a deterrence perspective, Washington did have tools that could have influenced Moscow’s calculations—preemptive sanctions, expanded arms shipments, and accelerated integration of Ukraine into Western frameworks. These options were discussed but not implemented before the invasion. After February 24, U.S. policy shifted: Washington became Ukraine’s main provider of military and economic assistance. Critics now argue that the failure to act sooner illustrates a lack of Democratic resolve for preventive measures.

The phrase "Biden’s war," when viewed as a political construct, encapsulates a series of decisions, delays, and strategic choices made over nearly twenty years of U.S. foreign policy. It overlooks Russia’s agency, domestic dynamics, and the Kremlin’s ideological drivers, yet reflects a belief within parts of the American and European establishment that the war resulted from a prolonged clash between pro-Western and anti-Western visions. In that sense, the phrase is more symbolic—an expression of perceived political accountability—than a definitive attribution of causality.

As the war enters its fourth year, the last thing many want is to argue over whose war it is. Russia started it—violating international law and invading the territory of a sovereign state. Yet however responsibility is assigned for missed warnings and unheeded measures, the full weight of this war falls on Ukrainian society—on those who fight, who grieve, who endure, and who attempt to rebuild. And with each passing month, in the absence of clear guarantees or viable exits, the future for which this struggle is being waged grows increasingly uncertain.